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I. Introduction: "Operation of a Pirate Ship" and the
Proposal of "Equipment Articles" for the Successful
Prosecution of Somali Pirates
Somali maritime piracy remains an urgent issue, involving
many human victims and a high cost to the international
community.' A January 2011 report by the U.N. Special Adviser
1 See Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE COMMERCIAL CRIMES SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-
centre/piracynewsafigures/275-piracynewsafigures (last updated Aug. 30, 2012); Anna
Bowden & Shikha Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, Working Paper, 2012) (estimating total cost around $7 billion). For a criticism of
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on Piracy, based on information from political representatives, law
enforcement, and legal experts from all affected areas, outlined a
comprehensive initiative on three fronts: economic, security, and
judicial/correctional. The report presented twenty-five proposals
corresponding to these three areas.2
The judicial proposals addressed issues of legislative reform
and cooperation in effective prosecutions and emphasized the need
to prosecute those who intend to commit piracy.' The Special
Adviser also addressed the issue of piracy prosecutions:
Article 103 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, concerning the definition of a pirate ship, includes the
intention to commit an act of piracy. However, the constituent
elements of that offense are not clearly defined. Unless the
perpetrators are caught in the act, many "acts" of piracy are not
prosecuted. National judicial systems must therefore also
-- 4criminalize intention.
In order to facilitate prosecution, the assembly of a case
should begin with a set of evidence, such as the presence of
equipment on board, a global positioning system, weapons, a
large quantity of fuel, the composition of the crew composition,
aerial observation of behavior and the type of ship for the zone
in question.5
Professor Eugene Kontorovich directly addresses the question
of prosecuting those who intend to commit acts of piracy by
suggesting that regional states adopt "equipment articles" which
create a presumption of criminal intent when certain listed
equipment is uncovered aboard ship.6 Kontorovich also gives a
the report, see Venetia Archer & Robert Young Pelton, Can We Ever Assess the True
Cost of Piracy?, SOMALIA REPORT (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.somaliareport.com/
index.php/post/2867 (suggesting that the report inflates many costs (and ignores others),
that it fails to distinguish between the costs of piracy, profits from private counter-piracy
operations and insurance, and that it does not assess the costs to effectively end piracy).
2 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General
on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2-3, UN Doc. S/2011/30
(Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia].
3 See id. 46-52, 59-60, 73-76, 95-100 & 104-08.
4 Id. 59.
5 Id. 60.
6 Eugene Kontorovich, Equipment Articles for the Prosecution of Maritime
Piracy, ONE EARTH FUTURE (May 17, 2010), http://www.oneearthfuture.org/
images/imagefiles/equipment%20articles%20for/o20the%20prosecution%2Oof%20marit
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brief history of "equipment articles," which originated in the
mixed commissions established by Great Britain to suppress the
slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century. The articles allowed
for a right-of-search on ships with specified equipment, made it
simpler to condemn the vessel, and eventually had a significant
effect on the slave trade.
These statutory presumptions, however, were not used in
criminal cases.9  Suggested criminal law analogues include
intentional possession of nonconventional weapons at sea"o and
drug possession on board vessels," both of which have withstood
challenges in the courts. 12 However, as neither weapons
trafficking nor drug trafficking are international crimes, nor are
they subject to universal jurisdiction according to most opinions,
they do not present the same issues as piracy.' Kontorovich
therefore proposes a version of the crime of piracy punishable
based on mere presence or possession-quite different than the
"intent to commit act of piracy," suggested by Special Adviser
Jack Lang. 14
Kontorovich also notes that there is no new crime of
ime%20piracy.pdf [hereinafter Kontorovich, Equipment Articles].
7 Id. at 2-4.
8 Id. at 3-4.
9 Id at 7-8 (noting that equipment articles were never used to establish mens rea,
and that in the context of piracy they would need to establish intent; to solve this
problem, they should only be used to establish "that the vessel is a 'pirate ship,"'
meaning to establish status of a vessel, with the corollary circumstantial presumption of
intent of those in dominant control). The essay itself is unclear on this point, but it
appears to suggest that it is not important to establish intent for the remaining crew of a
pirate ship, merely knowledge of facts. Id
10 Id at 4-5 (noting that the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Protocol) limits the
crime to intentional possession).
11 Id. at 5-6 (noting that the U.S. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
criminalizes the possession of large amounts of narcotics on the high seas, even without
evidence that they are headed to the United States, and has recently been amended to
include navigating on certain submersible vessels presumed to be drug smuggling
vessels because of their prevalent use in quickly destroying evidence and abandoning
ship).
12 See Kontorovich, Equipment Articles, supra note 6, at 6.
13 Id
14 See id.; Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, at
3.
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possession of equipment:
Since there is no international crime of carrying the relevant
equipment (RPGs, grappling hooks) aboard private vessels on
the high seas, equipment articles promulgated through national
legislation may raise concerns that they criminalize beyond what
the international law permits. But this concern misperceives
equipment laws. They do not define a new crime. Rather, they
establish the elements of proof for an existing crime-piracy.
This can be seen from the fact that the proposed articles only
make possession of the equipment a rebuttable presumption. A
suspect can be found in possession of the equipment yet
acquitted, because the possession is not the underlying crime -
rather, it is piracy against the law of nations.15
Kontorovich thus suggests that issues of criminal jurisdiction
would be resolved under his proposal because jurisdiction over the
substantive offense of piracy already exists pursuant to customary
international law and maritime treaties, most notably the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
(UNCLOS).16
Presumptions of intent from possession similar to the
equipment articles mentioned by Kontorovich are common in U.S.
law and have generally been held as constitutional." Moreover,
15 Kontorovich, Equipment Articles, supra note 6, at 6.
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
17 One common example is burglarious tools statutes, which imply intent to
burglarize from possession of tools. See Alfred Swersky, Note, Criminal Law -
Evidence-Presumption ofIntent Arising from Possession of Burglarious Tools, 6 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 227, 229 (1965) (concluding that burglar's tools statutes have been held
constitutional as long as they "are not conclusive" but may be overcome by defendant;
there is (a) a "rational connection" between the fact proved and the presumption; and (b)
no excessive burden or hardship to defendant). In a few rare cases, courts have found
statutory presumptions of intent from possession unconstitutional on their face. The
Supreme Court of Illinois , for example, struck down a municipal ordinance that created
an express presumption with no requirement of intent, and made it unlawful for a
defendant "to have in his possession any nippers of the description known as burglar's
nippers, pick lock, skeleton key, key to be used with a bit, jimmy, or other burglar's
instrument or tool of whatsoever kind or description" unless such person could show that
his possession was innocent and for a lawful purpose. City of Chicago v. Mulkey, 257
N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ill. 1970). For a discussion of the court's conclusion, see Symposium,
Illinois Supreme Court Review: Burglar's Tools Ordinance Unconstitutional, 65 Nw. U.
L. REv. 978, 980-83 (1970) (suggesting the court may have gone further than necessary,
that other cases have simply read a requirement of intent into the statute even where
2013] 477
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burden-shifting provisions in general do not present constitutional
problems" or international human rights problems; 9 although, the
there is an express presumption, and that burglarious tools statutes are unconstitutional
only where applied without evidence of intent). In practice, presumptions of intent may
require the same "character and quantum of evidence" as proof of intent itself, except
that the purpose of such evidence is different, i.e. it is aimed at proving the nature of the
tools rather than intent. See Note, Criminal Law: Proof of Intent Under Burglary Tool
Statutes: Benton v. United States, 282 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956), 1957 WASH. U. L.Q.
276 (1957). Presumptions of intent from possession of dangerous tools or weapons were
adopted in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) §§ 5.06-5.07
(2001).
18 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (discussing Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and holding that shifting the burden of proof for elements
of the offense violates due process, but shifting proof of affirmative defense to defendant
does not, where the facts that are elements of the offense must still be proven by
prosecutor). The Court itself notes the slippery slope of this proposition:
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now
defined in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond
which the States may not go in this regard. "[I]t is not within the province of a
legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.
Id. at 210 (internal citation omitted). See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child
Pornography: Does It Mean The End Of The Child Pornography Exception To The First
Amendment?, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 637, 667-73 & nn.142 & 144 (2004) (noting that
the Supreme Court has not articulated a comprehensive constitutional regime as to which
facts constitute elements of crimes).
19 See Salabiaku v. France, 141-A Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) 19 (1988)
("Presumptions of fact or of law operate in every legal system. Clearly, the Convention
does not prohibit such presumptions in principle. It does, however, require the
Contracting States to remain within certain limits in this respect as regards criminal
law.... It requires States to confine them within reasonable limits which take into
account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defense."). For
a dissenting view, see George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative
Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 884 &
n.16 (1968) (citing to Benton v. United States, 282 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and
comparing to Judgment of Oct. 3, 1958, 1959 Neue Juridische Wochenschrift 1932
(Landgericht, Heidelberg), as part of a more general trend in these jurisdictions to hold
that statutes presuming intent are violations of the presumption of innocence). Professor
Fletcher questions why similar presumptions in the cases of weapons, obscene materials
and narcotics do not give rise to "judicial anxieties" and suggests two explanations: first,
that in the latter cases possession itself manifests "sinister implications," and second, that
there is a risk to "all who come into contact with them." GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (2000). See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk
Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 599, 616-21 (1997)
(discussing the section). The "common experience" of risk from certain criminal tools is
probably at the basis of the Model Penal Code distinction between offensive weapons,
which are prohibited entirely in § 5.07, and tools which have lawful use, but for which a
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statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is particularly
strict in this regard.20  The problem with equipment articles for
piracy is related to the specific context of absolute universal
jurisdiction-with no nexus to the state trying the offense.2
Because the pirate is not on notice of any country's specific laws,
a wide-ranging interpretation of UNCLOS, which in effect creates
a new crime, would be contrary to the principle of legality.2 2 This
Article is primarily concerned with examining this potential
problem and its ramifications, as well as examining trends in
current piracy prosecutions, rather than in proposing concrete
solutions.
During the years of the recent Somali piracy phenomenon, the
Security Council has chosen to build its enforcement regime
around UNCLOS. 23 Express reservations in each Security Council
presumption of intent is still appropriate, discussed in § 5.06. See Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 495 A.2d 584, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("[I]t is useful to distinguish between
those weapons which are offensive in themselves, meaning that the universal experience
within our society has been that these weapons are used only in furtherance of crime, and
those that can be used offensively, in the hands of one inclined to do so, but also have
recognized uses of a socially acceptable nature.. . . It is clear that section 908 was
'intended to establish a prohibition very nearly absolute aimed at the implements or
weapons themselves, whether enumerated or falling within the general definition, which
are offensive by nature."') (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
20 See William A. Schabas, Article 66, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OBSERVERS NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 833, 839
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 1999) (noting that while "[tihe presumption of innocence may
be breached where an accused person is required to produce evidence to counter the
charge," most jurisdictions allow some derogation from the principle by legal provisions
and inferences, and "[t]he least offensive of such provisions are so-called factual
presumptions, where proof of one fact is deemed, by the court, to constitute proof of
another, incriminating fact ... . [T]his approach is defended by judges as nothing more
than a common sense rule, a logical deduction from the facts").
21 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
74-76 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal)
(arguing that there is no established practice of pure universal jurisdiction-akin to that
applied to piracy-without links to the state, and virtually all national legislation
envisages some territorial link, although there may be a trend of allowing jurisdiction for
certain heinous crimes on bases other than territoriality).
22 See UNCLOS, supra note 16, pmbl. (explaining that UNCLOS establishes "a
legal order for the seas and oceans").
23 ROBIN GEIB & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND THE GULF OF ADEN 78
(2011).
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resolution relating to piracy emphasize that authorized
enforcement measures apply only with respect to the situation in
Somalia and do not alter existing law or define piracy more
broadly as a threat to peace.24
Regional agreements have also focused on incorporating the
provisions of UNCLOS into domestic law.25 In 2008, the
Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) sent
a circular letter to all IMO member states requesting an update on
their national legislation on piracy.2 6 In November 2010,
responses from 41 states were reviewed by the Legal Committee
of the IMO and submitted for inclusion in the UN Database. 27 The
IMO concluded that national legislation is not harmonized with
regard to piracy, which could have an adverse effect on
prosecutions. 28 However, as of the writing of this article, regional
24 Id.; see S.C. Res. 1816, pmbl. at paras. 4 & 9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2,
2008) (reaffirming that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS sets out the legal
framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, and affirming that
the provisions of the resolution shall apply only to the situation in Somalia); S.C. Res.
1838, pmbl. at paras. 3 & 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, pmbl.
at paras. 4 & 11, U.N. Doc S/Res/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, pmbl. at paras. 4
& 11, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897, pmbl. at paras. 4 & 8,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, pmbl. at paras. 4-5, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950, pmbl. at paras. 6 & 8, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1976, pmbl. at paras. 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1976
(Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 2015, pmbl. at paras. 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/2015 (Oct. 24,
2011); S.C Res. 2020, pmbl. at paras. 7 & 10, U.N. Doc. S/Res/2020 (2011).
25 Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden ("Djibouti Code of Conduct"), art. 11, IMO Doc. C/102/4 (2009).
26 IMO, Request for Information on National Legislation on Piracy, Circ. Letter
2933, (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
SecDocs/Documents/Piracy/CL2933.pdf.
27 See IMO, Legal Committee (LEG), 97th Sess: 5-9 October 2009 (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Legal/Pages/LEG-96th-
Session.aspx (reviewing national legislation and "noting that, in most cases, piracy is not
addressed as an independent, separate offence"); IMO, Legal Committee (LEG), - 97th
Sess: 15-19 November 2010 (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/
MeetingSummaries/Legal/Pages/LEG-97th-Session.aspx (reviewing responses from 41
states, and concluding that inconsistencies "might have an adverse effect on the process
of prosecution").
28 Id.; see also IMO, Legal Committee, Piracy: Review ofNational Legislation, J
5-6, IMO Doc. LEG 97/9 (Sept. 10, 2010) (listing "general conclusions from the
secretariat's review of the material provided" in response to the circular letter).
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states are increasingly implementing the definition of piracy in
UNCLOS into their penal codes, and more frequently will
prosecute the bulk of universal jurisdiction piracy cases.29
Nonetheless, UNCLOS itself is ambiguous in its provisions
relating to attempt and accessory crimes, and these provisions
have not yet been fully interpreted in the context of criminal trials.
This article argues that prosecution of alleged pirates who
cruise with equipment creates problems of legality in regional
piracy prosecutions because it is, in effect, punishing an act that
has not been established as piracy. This is true even if the piracy
definition in UNCLOS Article 101 is adopted by regional states as
the basis of their criminal statutes of piracy, and if the definition is
accepted as customary international law, because the definition's
implications as a criminal norm are in early stages of
development.
The article proceeds as follows: the first part addresses the
theoretical basis of universal jurisdiction over piracy and the
history of the UNCLOS definition of piracy, with an emphasis on
UNCLOS Article 101(b), "operation of a pirate ship." The second
part addresses the problem of legality for defendants where an
international treaty, which may be read as a state agreement to
prosecute certain offenses, is re-characterized as a binding
criminal statute. This re-characterization is present when
UNCLOS Article 101, which is not a criminal law, is incorporated
into state penal codes. The legality issue would arise if the treaty
text of UNCLOS were broader than the established criminal
norm.30 The third section of the article analyzes prosecutions in
29 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized
Anti-piracy Courts in Somalia and other States in the region, 41, U.N. Doc. S/2012/50
(Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter SG Report Jan. 2012] (noting revision of Seychelles Penal
Code § 65 as of March 2010 to conform with UNCLOS, undertaken with assistance of
the UNODC); id. 58 (noting revision of Kenyan Merchant Shipping Act § 371 to
conform with UNCLOS, undertaken with assistance of UNODC); id. 81 (noting
adoption of the Piracy and Maritime Violence Act as of January 2011 by Mauritius
which reflects the definition of piracy in UNCLOS); id. 98 (noting amendment of
Republic of Tanzania Penal Code as of May 2010 to reflect UNCLOS definition); id
124 (concluding that a great deal of work is under way to ensure successful prosecutions
of pirates in regional states).
30 See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101. Such a distinction is based on an
assumption that state law and state practice define a customary law interpretation of
UNCLOS, which is more limited than the full range of acts that might fall under its
2013] 481
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Kenya and Seychelles for trends relating to the operation of a
pirate ship. Finally, this article concludes by discussing the
current regime of piracy prosecutions and the possible future
enactment of equipment articles.
II. Universal Jurisdiction Over Piracy and its Limits
Presumably, maritime piracy in international law should be
discussed within the context of international crime. Piracy is often
studied as part of a process of the development and application of
international criminal law, for which the most foundational
questions are jurisdiction and elements of liability."1 However,
one of the most influential modern writers to analyze the topic,
Alfred Rubin, concludes that the use of the term "piracy" in
historical sources involves a more complex interplay between a
criminal law concept and a political label used to justify naval
attacks.3 2 This justification by necessity allowed attacking and
killing "pirates" who had not yet committed any crimes, but were
merely identified by their ships." Since it is now accepted that
piracy is defined by UNCLOS Article 101, and states have
criminal laws that punish piracy, this debate is somewhat
academic.3 4 Nevertheless, it is important to note as a guiding
principle when addressing the provision of UNCLOS Article
101(b), "operation of a pirate ship," which may have traces of
political use of the term "pirate" in a criminal law definition."
In general, criminal jurisdiction is the competence of a state or
other international body under international law to arrest,
prosecute, and punish wrongdoers for crime. It is widely agreed
that, under international law and the principle of non-intervention,
there are several limitations on a state's jurisdiction. These
limitations prohibit a state from: (a) prescribing laws, or making
provisions. See id. This allows defendants to rely on the narrower interpretation, which
is the only interpretation that is genuinely accessible and foreseeable. See id. To
demonstrate this narrower interpretation, the Article delves into state practice and law
and shows that there appears to be a general agreement not to prosecute unless a violent
attack has begun.
31 See ALFRED P. RuBIN, THE LAW OF PiRAcY 33 (1st ed., 1988).
32 See id at 343-44.
33 See id. at 36.
34 See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101.
35 Id.
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them applicable to persons and their interests; (b) adjudicating
claims, or subjecting persons to the process of its courts; and (c)
enforcing, introducing, or compelling compliance with its laws.3 6
Most traditionally, states apply their criminal law to crimes
committed on the territory of the state or against its flagged ships
and aircraft.37 States may also apply their criminal laws
extraterritorially if the crimes are committed by state nationals
abroad. Somewhat more controversially, a state may punish an
individual for a crime where the victim was a national (the
"passive personality" principle), or if the crime injures the
interests of a state (the "protective principle")." All of these
theories of jurisdiction are based on territoriality and the sovereign
authority of a state, but certain universal crimes are punishable
without regard to sovereignty because the universality principle
transcends sovereignty.40
"Universal jurisdiction to prevent and suppress piracy has been
widely recognized in customary international law as the
international crime par excellence to which universality applies." 4 1
However, universal criminal jurisdiction over piracy is justified
only over conduct "which constitutes piracy by international
law."4 2 Since every jurisdiction may have municipal definitions of
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401 (1987).
37 See Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 439, art. 1 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft on Jurisdiction].
38 Id. at 440, arts. 5-6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402.
39 Harvard Draft on Jurisdiction, supra note 37, at 440, arts. 7-8 (explaining the
protective principle); id. at 445 (noting controversial aspects of the passive personality
principle); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402 (noting protective principle); id. § 403 (omitting the passive personality principle in
favor of a reasonableness analysis).
40 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 96 (2001)
[hereinafter Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction].
41 Id. at 110-11; GEIo & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 143 & n.588 (noting cases which
state that universal jurisdiction over piracy has consolidated into an international law
norm).
42 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 248 (Sept. 7); Harvard
Draft on Jurisdiction, supra note 37, art. 9; see GEIB & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 144-45
(noting examples of municipal law definition in Kenya, a hub of piracy prosecution,
which do not conform with the UNCLOS definition); see also Eugene Kontorovich, The
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the crime of piracy that extend beyond the definition of piracy
under international law, a state's competence to apply its
municipal definition must be limited to traditional bases of
jurisdiction.43 Thus, for example, if a nation broadly defines
piracy as robbery at sea with no "high seas" limitation, it may only
punish such attacks where its nationals or ships are involved."
Several theoretical arguments have been proposed to explain
universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. The status of
pirates as hostis humani generis, or enemies of all humankind,
allowing them to be punished in the courts of any nation, has been
noted frequently as justification for universal jurisdiction in
national courts for a variety of international crimes.45 Universal
jurisdiction over serious human rights violations, such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, is often based on
natural law concept of universal wrongs that offend the conscience
of mankind, expanding upon the notion that pirates, bandits, and
assassins should likewise be punishable by any state because of
the gravity of their crime.4 Piracy, however, does not stand out in
most modern penal codes as a particularly heinous offense. More
'Define and Punish' Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. UNIV. L.
REv. 149, 167-68 (2009) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Define and Punish] (arguing that the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution were acutely aware of the distinction between piracies
and ordinary felonies, and may have created a constitutional limit on jurisdiction
distinguishing between piracy jure gentium and statutory piracy).
43 See Harvard Draft on Jurisdiction, supra note 37, at 566.
44 See id at 566, 588.
45 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT. L.J. 183, 184-85 & n.10 (2004) [hereinafter
Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy] (noting sources); Int'l Law Association, Committee on
Int'l Human Rights Law and Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses 3 (2000) [hereinafter ILA
Report] (citing the source of the term and the comparison to Willard B. Cowles,
Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REv 177 (1945)).
46 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 185-86 (listing cases that
created this development); ILA Report, supra note 46 at 3 (summarizing Cowles for the
proposition that such crimes "were to be regarded as offences against the conscience of
the civilized world," although Cowles himself based the argument more on consent); see
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69-70 (1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni, International Crimes]
(noting that characterization of a crime asjus cogens oftens depends on whether a crime
threatens world peace or security, or whether it shocks the conscience of humankind;
piracy does neither, "although it may have at one time").
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pragmatic and positivist thinkers have viewed state jurisdiction
over piracy as an arrangement that allowed privateering but
forbade unauthorized raids or as an arms limitation agreement
between states.47 Actions contemplated against pirates as enemies
of all humankind have thus been viewed as direct executive action,
not criminal prosecution."
A. The Universal Condemnation of the Crime ofPiracy
The notion that piracy is a crime that is "regarded as the most
heinous by the international community," and therefore punishable
by any court where the pirate may be found,49 has become widely
accepted as the basis of an analogy between piracy and other gross
human rights offenses."o That assertion, however, may not be
supported by historical sources." Pirates have been described as
hostis humani generis, an expression which may date back to
Cicero, but was first used by Lord Coke in 1797 to describe piracy
as a form of treason.5 2 Blackstone later used the expression to
describe piracy as a crime "against the universal law of society"
47 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 213, 222-23 (comparing
privateering to arms agreement and noting how this made many U.S. piracy cases turn on
the validity of a letter of marque). Kontorovich concludes by questioning whether the
precedent should be extended to other crimes. Id. Others have claimed that universal
jurisdiction should not even exist over piracy. RUBIN, supra note 31, at 309-310, 343-44
(suggesting that universal jurisdiction over piracy, as a source of individual criminal
liability, is based in confusion by natural law thinkers interpreting precedent). See
Michael Joshua Goodwin, Note, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old
Couple to Part, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 988-1002 (2006) (examining six
potential bases for universal jurisdiction and concluding that none of them still justify the
doctrine).
48 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 231.
49 GEla & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 145 (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 60-61 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal)); see Kenneth Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785, 794 (1988) ("A more
accurate rationale for not limiting jurisdiction over pirates to their state of nationality
relies on the fundamental nature of piratical offenses. Piracy may comprise particularly
heinous and wicked acts of violence or depredation . . . .").
50 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 204-10 (noting how the
heinousness principle sustains modern extensions of universal jurisdiction).
51 Id. at 230-36 (rejecting interpretation of Vattel that supports the comparison
between piracy and heinous offenses, and judicial use of epithets).
52 See Goodwin, supra note 47, at 989-91 (describing possible origins of the
phrase).
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but did not describe the substance of the crime as heinous; rather,
his argument is similar to de-nationalization, discussed below.5 3
After the Second World War, the Allied war tribunals used the
universality principle extensively to justify their jurisdiction over
war crimes-making use of the comparison to piracy, though
emphasizing the gap in jurisdiction more than the heinousness of
the crimes.S4
The comparison between piracy and crimes against humanity
based on the rationale of heinousness was further developed by the
Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann Appeal to answer both
the questions of universal jurisdiction and individual criminal
responsibility:
[T]hese crimes constitute acts which damage vital international
interests; they impair the foundations and security of the
international community; they violate universal moral values
and humanitarian principles that lie hidden in the criminal law
systems adopted by civilized nations. The underlying principle
in international law regarding such crimes is that the individual
who has committed any of them and who, when doing so, may
be presumed to have fully comprehended the heinous nature of
his act, must account for his conduct.55
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) further developed this analogy,56 and it has since become a
53 See id. at 992.
54 See, e.g., United Nations War Crimes Comm'n., 1 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 42, 53, 103 (1947), available at http://www.1oc.gov/rr/
frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Law-Reports Vol-1.pdf ("[T]he general doctrine recently
expounded and called 'universality of jurisdiction over war crimes,' which has the
support of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and according to which every
independent State has, under International Law, jurisdiction to punish not only pirates
but also war criminals in its custody, regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the
place where the offence was committed, particularly where, for some reason, the
criminal would otherwise go unpunished."). The analogy to war crimes is much closer
to piracy, because brigands also reject the authority of all states, and conduct acts of war
outside the jurisdiction of any state. See Cowles, supra note 45, at 181-207 (reviewing
historical sources and eloquently removing distinctions between piracy and war crimes).
At about this time, Lauterpacht-cited in the Eichmann Appeal below-expressed the
notion that universal jurisdiction should be exercised over all heinous offenses, similar to
piracy, de legeferenda. H. Lauterpacht, Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal
Jurisdiction over Aliens, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 330, 348 n.61 (1947).
55 See Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 289-294 [1962] (Isr.).
56 See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
486 [Vol. XXXVIII
2013] EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PIRACY 487
common argument in the writings of many scholars and jurists as a
theoretical foundation for universal jurisdiction in national courts
over grave human rights crimes that offend the conscience of all
humankind.
Some have argued that this explanation is problematic as the
basis for universal jurisdiction over piracy and certainly should not
be extended to other offenses." Piracy is not a particularly
heinous crime-it is comparable to robbery or kidnapping on
land-and certainly does not shock "the conscience of the
civilized world" in the same sense as genocide, war crimes, or
crimes against humanity. 59 Furthermore, privateers, engaged in
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (arguing that court's jurisdiction was justified as delegated jurisdiction
from the Security Council, which transcends sovereignty in a way similar to universal
jurisdiction, "in view of the nature of the offences alleged against Appellant, offences
which, if proven, do not affect the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience
of mankind"); Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 147
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998) (citing Filartiga v. Peiha-
Irala for the proposition that "the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader
before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind"); id. 156 (citing Eichman
for the proposition that the universal abhorrence of the crime justifies universal
jurisdiction).
57 See generally Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45 (discussing the
analogy as a basis for universal jurisdiction over piracy).
58 See African Union, Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction by Some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference
of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General 11, AU Doc. EX.CL/4 11 (XIII) (June 24-28,
2008) ("It is common to find general and expansive assertions including a wider range of
international crimes, than is actually the case."); id 1 40 (concluding that moral
reprehensibility does not equate to universal jurisdiction). See Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 74-76 (Feb. 14) (joint separate
opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal) (arguing that there is no
established practice of pure universal jurisdiction - akin to that applied to piracy -
without links to the state, and virtually all national legislation envisages some territorial
link, although there may be a trend allowing jurisdiction for certain heinous crimes on
bases other than territoriality). While these Judges find that the practice has not become
established, they admit that it is not unlawful either and apply the heinousness analogy to
piracy. Id. at 81-83 (arguing that such category should be strictly limited only to the
most heinous crimes of piracy, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly
genocide).
59 ILA Report, supra note 45, at 3; Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at
223-26. Even those who argue for a strong enforcement of jus cogens crimes would
admit that piracy "neither threatens peace and security nor shocks the conscience of
humanity, though it may have at one time." Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note
46, at 70.
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exactly the same acts as pirates, were recognized as legitimate
when they committed raids on ships and land with the authority of
a letter of marque from a monarch.60 Since the actus reus of
privateering is the same as piracy, it is difficult to understand why
piracy is heinous.6 1 Others would argue that many acts that are
lawful in times of war are heinous in times of peace and, similarly,
privateering could be a lawful act of warfare, while piracy remains
62a heinous crime. Moreover, the decision to outlaw privateering
as early as the Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856 is strong
precedent for a universal repulsion of acts of piracy.63
The comparison of piracy to other heinous crimes has led to
the conceptualization of piracy as an international jus cogens
crime64 for which universal jurisdiction should exist as part of a
general enforcement of the international order.65 Advocates of this
60 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 210-23.
61 GEI8 & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 145.
62 Id. at 146.
63 See Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 46 (2009) ("The Declaration would seem to be the decisive
turning point in the ambivalence of states towards piracy, and to affirm a universal
prohibition."). The outlawing of privateering corresponded with attempts to label
unlawful enemy warfare as piracy, therefore making it not subject to the laws of war. A
first such attempt was made by the drafters of the Lieber Code promulgated by President
Lincoln in 1864. See RUBIN, supra note 31, at 293-94. The same trend led to attempts in
the early 20th century to consider submarine attacks on merchant ships piracy, based on
analogy between piracy and violations of the laws of war. See id. at 294-96 & n.14. See
J.E.G. de Montmorency, Piracy and the Barbary Corsairs, 33 L. Q. REV. 133, 141-42
(1919) (describing piracy as a type of war crime, and that this "foul disease in the body
politic of nations" can only be removed by "the definite formulation of an International
Criminal Law, and by the specific recognition of the capacity of a sovereign state to
commit a crime").
64 See Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 46, at 107-08 (noting piracy is
the source of universal criminal jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes, but that was not
always the case); see id. at 104 (suggesting that there is an independent theory of
universal jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes, based on heinousness and the impunity
gap); see id at 136 (suggesting that customary international law is now more settled with
regard to the three crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, but "to this
writer, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, torture and apartheid should also be
included in this category").
65 See id. at 104 . It is unclear if the jus cogens label would involve an obligatio
erga omnes and a duty to prosecute. See Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, supra note 2, 49 (noting that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is optional
under UNCLOS, but "the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation enshrines an obligation to prosecute or extradite").
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concept see pirates as direct subjects of international law who
violate its provisions by committing piracy as defined by
UNCLOS.6 6
B. Other Explanations For Universal Jurisdiction Over
Piracy
Other explanations for universal jurisdiction over piracy focus
on the need to allow criminal jurisdiction where there is no state to
prosecute and no traditional basis for jurisdiction is sufficient.6 7
These rationales developed as part of a general need to ensure the
safety of commerce at sea and as part of a projection of power by
Great Britain and other seafaring nations. They may be based on
the statelessness of defendants since pirates and pirate ships reject
connection with any state.68 Thus, pirates may be seen as
denationalized by having rejected the authority of their state of
nationality and the authority of all states: they "hav[e] ceased to be
State citizens altogether in consequence of their having broken the
laws of humanity as a whole, and become enemies of the human
race."' 9 Statelessness, however, is a fiction, and a flag state (the
66 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d. 599, 640 (E.D. Va. 2010)
("Furthermore, as claimed Somali nationals, Defendants were subject to UNCLOS, and
thus, in a sense, already bound by the piracy provisions in UNCLOS as treaty law,
separate and apart from its binding effect as customary international law."); HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 344-45 (2d ed. 1946) ("The sanction is
directed against a pirate as an individual who has violated international law. This
sanction of international law is executed according to the principle of individual
responsibility.").
67 Randall, supra note 49, at 793.
68 See Goodwin, supra note 47, at 988; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
71 ("[A] pirate being, according to sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis. As therefore
he has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself
afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind
must declare war against him: for that every community hath a right, by the rule of self-
defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a state of
nature have been otherwise entitled to do, any invasion of his person or personal
property."); Randall, supra note 49, at 793 (arguing that this rationale is also connected
to the individual actor, and that "by engaging in piracy" both "individuals and their
vessels become denationalized").
69 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 739, 753 (1932)
(citing JAMES LORIMER, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 132 (1883)). This
rationale appears to have been the basis of the Acting Senior Principal Magistrate who
found that Kenya had universal jurisdiction because piracy "lies beyond the protection of
any state." See James Thuo Gathii, Kenya's Piracy Prosecutions, 104 AM. J. INT'L L.
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state to which a vessel is registered) does not lose traditional bases
of jurisdiction because of intent to commit piracy or acts of
piracy.0
A more modem argument is that piracy occurs in
circumstances where "it is impossible or unfair to hold any state
responsible for [its] commission;" since there is no state to
prosecute, universal jurisdiction must be exercised.7' Furthermore,
piracy, by definition, must be committed on the high seas and,
since all states have an interest in the free flow of international
commerce and are potential victims of piracy, jurisdiction
developed as a solution allowing any state to seize pirate ships and
apply criminal jurisdiction to pirates.72
While the heinousness arguments are closely related to the
development of international criminal law, these latter arguments
do not necessarily understand piracy to be an "international crime"
in the sense of implying individual criminal liability or a duty of
states to prosecute.73 Instead the arguments are based on an
416, 423 & n.23 (2010) [hereinafter Gathii, Prosecutions] (citing Republic v. Hassan
Mohamud Ahmed & 9 Others, (2006) Criminal Case No. 434 of 2006 (Chief Magis. Ct.)
(Kenya) (suggesting Magistrate B.T. Jaden's decision was based on statelessness of
defendants in that piracy lies "beyond the protection of any state").
70 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 104; Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra
note 69, at 825 ("[I]f the pirate ship had a national character before it was engaged in
piracy, its participation in piracy does not withdraw it from the ordinary jurisdiction and
rights of its flag state without that state's consent.").
71 See Azubuike, supra note 63, at 47 (citing WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 214-15 (1880)). This argument is used by the Supreme Court
of Seychelles, quoting In re Piracy Jure Gentium, but is bolstered by the notion of jus
cogens crimes. See infra notes 391-398 and accompanying text.
72 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that
universal jurisdiction over piracy exists "because of the threat that piracy poses to
orderly transport and commerce between nations, and because the crime occurs
statelessly on the high seas"); Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at
788 (citing Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts
for the Progressive Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc.
C.196.M.70 1927 V, 117 (1927)) ("Piracy has as its field of operation that vast domain
which is termed 'the high seas.' It constitutes a crime against the security of commerce
on the high seas, where alone it can be committed.").
73 See Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 751-54 (citing views
that regard piracy as an international crime against all society, and especially the
Romanian position that "piracy [is] a prototype to ... which should be assimilated in
time all crimes universally recognized as offences against society"); id. at 754-60
(contrasting these views to others which tend to find piracy as simply a special basis for
490
2013] EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PIRACY 491
extraordinary jurisdiction which allows states to apply their
municipal criminal law to a crime that could only be addressed by
interstate cooperation, and that by its nature, location, and effects
defines a shared interest that can be applied with minimal
disruption of the world order.7 4
This basis is borne out in practice, suggesting that piracy
prosecutions are an arrangement of convenience between states,
rather than an enforcement of a universal morality. Universal
jurisdiction over human rights crimes has been criticized for
potentially disrupting world order by interfering with the
sovereignty of states and leading to controversial political
prosecutions.7 5 Piracy prosecutions, however, have been less
subject to these criticisms." Despite the relative scarcity of actual
cases applying universal jurisdiction over piracy, the practice
appears to be developing." Notably, applications of universal
jurisdiction).
74 Id. at 761 ("It consists in the permissibility and other legal effects of state acts
on the high seas with respect to foreign ships, property, and persons, which, were it not
for the special authority over piracy, would be violations of international law.").
75 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 289-90 (1st ed. 2003)
(noting "various reasons that militate against applying such absolute jurisdiction, at least
if resorted to with regard to political or military leaders"); Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls
of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIN AFF., no. 4, July/Aug. 2011 at 86, 88 ("But any
universal system should contain procedures not only to punish the wicked but also to
constrain the righteous. It must not allow legal principles to be used as weapons to settle
political scores."). See also Zachary Mills, Note, Does the World Need Knights Errant
to Combat Enemies of All Mankind? Universal Jurisdiction, Connecting Links, and Civil
Liability, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1315, 1350-59 (2009).
76 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d. 599, 610-612 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(citing Kissinger, supra note 75, and noting "that these arguments, presented in the
debate over whether universal jurisdiction should cover modem international law
offenses, are inapplicable to piracy," because of its unique history and acceptance, and
primarily because it does not interfere with sovereignty). See also CASSESE, supra note
75, at 291 (suggesting that universal jurisdiction over other international crimes is best
applied to low-level defendants because it does not implicate sovereignty).
77 See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 436, 437-38 (2010) [hereinafter Kontorovich
& Art, An Empirical Examination].
78 See Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, 1 50
(noting that Kenya was the first regional state to exercise universal jurisdiction, by virtue
of the decision of the Subordinate Court at Mombasa of Oct. 26, 2006, and on this basis,
50 pirates were sentenced in 2009 and 2010); SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, 41
(noting that the Seychelles has prosecuted seven cases to date on the basis of universal
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jurisdiction over pirates have been met with little resistance from
states, compared to other "modem universal jurisdiction crimes."7 9
Piracy is thus an important test case for a broader question in
international criminal law - the extent to which international law
relates to individuals. Heinousness arguments are more focused
on individual crimes and the problem of impunity.so By extension,
this approach should also be focused on human rights,
presumptions of innocence, and notice of the crime charged. The
more practical state interest approach is instead more focused on
creating a regime without loopholes so that issues of jurisdiction
may not be raised on behalf of accused individuals."' The crime of
"operation of a pirate ship" is a good test case for the ramifications
of these divergent historical approaches. As discussed in the next
section, if UNCLOS Article 101(b) is read as a separate criminal
act of piracy, it is not easily categorized as a "heinous crime,"
especially where intent is proven primarily by presence and
association.82 Thus, UNCLOS is best explained as part of an
international agreement to prosecute. Even if the primary concern
of the law is practical, such prosecutions may need to be treated
differently than those for core piracy offenses, especially if there is
no clearly established law prohibiting cruising for piracy.
C. Historic Sources on State Practice of Universal
Jurisdiction Over Piracy
There are few cases of actual universal criminal jurisdiction
over piracy." More frequently, cases prosecute piracy under
sovereignty-based jurisdiction, i.e. prosecution by a victim state.84
jurisdiction).
79 GEIB & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 146. The debate on the obligation to prosecute
is also less important as regards piracy, since piracy convictions do not interfere with
state sovereignty. See Michael P. Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the
International Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 41, 61 (Autumn 1996).
80 See Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 289-294 [1962] (Isr.).
81 See Republic v. Mohamed Abdi Jama & Six Others ("Jama"), Judgment, 58,
Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012) (Seychelles) (on file with author).
82 See UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101.
83 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608-609 & n. 1 (E.D. Va.
2010).
84 See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Major Achievements in the
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Piracy convictions include prosecutions for attempted piracy,
crimes of service on board a vessel (Dutch law), or voluntary
participation (under laws implementing UNCLOS), but the facts
of the cases have almost always involved violent attacks." This
article contends that attempted piracy begins with some act of
violence, and that cruising for piracy is not part of the crime of
piracy in state practice.
Most assertions of adjudicative jurisdiction for piracy require a
strong nexus to the offense." There are very few actual criminal
cases in which the court asserted universal jurisdiction over piracy
where the prosecuting state had no connection to the offense either
as the flag state of the victim vessel or the nationality of the
perpetrators or the victims. 87 The first was R. v. Green,"8 where
the High Court of Admiralty in Scotland asserted jurisdiction over
Captain Thomas Green based entirely on the locus deprehensionis,
with no connection other than the universal right of pursuit
through prosecution, since 'piracy' is a crime against the law of
nations, and .. . all mankind have an interest in pursuing it." 89
Captain Green was hanged for plundering a vessel, sinking the
vessel, and tossing the crew overboard - although the crew was
later found to be alive. 90
In People v. Lol-lo and Saraw,91 an American court sitting in
the Philippines found two defendants guilty of piracy for attacking
and sinking a ship and raping the women on board. 92 The victims
Courtroom: Piracy Cases, OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefingroom/ns/mcapiracy.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2012) (discussing piracy cases prosecuted in the United States).
85 See infra notes 340-52 (giving examples when violent attackers were
prosecuted).
86 See RUBIN, supra note 31, at 317 n.100.
87 See id. (noting only three cases).
88 Tryal of Captain Thomas Green and His Crew, [1705] EWHC (Admlty) 39.
89 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 93-94 & nn.85-89 (citing 14 How. St. Tr. 1199, 1211-
12 (1705)); THE TRYAL OF CAPTAIN THOMAS GREEN AND HIS CREW: PURSUED BEFORE
THE JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF SCOTLAND 13 (Anderson & Sons eds.,
1705) (discussing jurisdiction).
90 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 93.
91 People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 PHIL. REP. 19 (S.C. 1922) (Phil.), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juril922/febl922/gr 1-17958_1922.html.
92 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 318-19 (citing Lol-lo andSaraw, 43 PHIL. REP. 19).
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were Dutch, the crime was committed in foreign territorial waters,
and the American court, although it was the occupying power in
Manila and presumably could have applied its law to residents of
the Philippines, applied universal jurisdiction." Piracy, in that
instance, was defined to be "robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in
the spirit and intention of universal hostility."9 4
The third case is In re Piracy Jure Gentium," in which the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council received a case on appeal
from the British Tribunal of Hong Kong; it involved an
unsuccessful attack by two Chinese junks of a Chinese cargo
ship.96 The question before the Privy Council was "[w]hether an
accused person may be convicted of piracy in circumstances
where no robbery has occurred." 97 The ultimate answer in this
case was "that actual robbery is not an essential element in the
crime of piracy jure gentium, and that a frustrated attempt to
commit piratical robbery is equally piracy jure gentium.""
Rubin notes two other cases asserting such universal
jurisdiction over piracy, totaling five since 1705.99 Kontorovich
counts one case in India and two in China in the twelve years prior
to 2009, and several prosecutions of Somali pirates in Kenya. 00
Kontorovich also suggests that Rubin might have undercounted,
because he only includes reported cases, while many early cases
were summary proceedings onboard ships.o' However, summary
93 Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 PHIL. REP. at 19 ("The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state."); RUBIN, supra note 31, at 318-19.
94 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 318.
95 In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.).
96 Id. at 587.
97 Id. at 588.
98 Id. at 600.
99 Compare Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 192 n.51, with
Kontorovich & Art, An Empirical Examination, supra note 77, at 451.
100 Kontorovich & Art, An Empirical Examination, supra note 78, at 451.
101 Id. at 32 n.53; Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 192 n.51 ("Many
more cases were unreported in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than today.
Reporters would be particularly uncommon in remote ports. Furthermore, the reported
cases obviously do not include summary proceedings at sea, where pirates could be sunk
or hanged upon apprehension."); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 609 &
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proceedings may be more analogous to military action than
precedent for criminal law or universal adjudicative jurisdiction.
The conclusion, even by judges and scholars in favor of
applying an international law of piracy, is that absolute universal
jurisdiction over piracy was dormant until the recent surge of
Somali piracy.'02 Although scholars have almost unanimously
agreed on the existence of a right of states to prosecute pirates as
an abstract proposition, 03  an international criminal norm has
rarely been applied except by states with a connection to the
crime.' 04 This scarcity of universal prosecutions should weigh
against enlarging the offense to cases with no victims at all.
Where there are victims, even of an unsuccessful attack, the
existing definition of piracy may be sufficient to put pirates on
notice of conviction;o' but where there are none, the law of piracy
remains an "abstract proposition" involving an obligation on states
but not a criminal norm.106
n.Il (E.D. Va. 2010).
102 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 603 & nn.3-4 (noting long lapse in American
prosecutions of piracy); id at 608-09 & n. 11 (noting paucity of cases applying universal
jurisdiction).
103 Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 192. U.S. law defines piracy by
the law of nations, and U.S. courts have recently embraced the UNCLOS definition as
providing this definition. See United States v. Dire, No. 11-4310, at *41-42 (4th Cir.
May 23, 2012) (affirming prior ruling by the Eastern District Court of Virginia). But
these cases may be limited to attacks on U.S. ships. Acts of piracy have more clearly
been held to be universal violations of international law for purposes of civil liability
under the Alien Tort Statute. See Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-32
(2004). Piracy was raised several times in oral argument in relationship to liability of
Shell for assisting the Nigerian government in human rights violations. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, (Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 10-1491), at 26-27
(Breyer, J.) (". . . if Hitler isn't a pirate, who is? And if, in fact, an equivalent torturer or
dictator who wants to destroy an entire race in his own country is not the equivalent of
today's pirate, who is? And we have treaties that say there is universal jurisdiction. Other
countries take it.").
104 GElf & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 140-41.
105 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (noting that section 1651 incorporates UNCLOS
by reference, and pirates are on notice of UNCLOS as treaty law).
106 Cf Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 45, at 192 (providing that
universal jurisdiction over piracy "was more a matter of theory than of practice" and that
"very few criminal prosecutions for piracy can be found that depended on the universal
principle").
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III. The Modern Definition of the Crime of Piracy: UNCLOS
Article 101
UNCLOS, including both its definition of piracy and the
regime of cooperation for its suppression,to' has been widely
accepted as authoritative customary international law'o and thus
binding on all states.109 However, while UNCLOS provides a
definition of piracy, it does not criminalize the offense, prohibit
individual conduct, or provide for the punishment for the
offense."o This is distinct from the Genocide Convention, for
example, which defines genocide in Article 2, but then specifically
declares that "the following actions shall be punishable" in Article
3, and requires states to criminalize."' Moreover, the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC are all accepted as international
crimes entailing individual criminal liability, but piracy is not
among them." 2  Some have argued that Article 101 should,
therefore, be interpreted as a jurisdictional basis for the
enforcement acts listed in the convention, but that it is not a
criminal norm and cannot serve directly as the basis of
prosecutions." 3 According to those scholars, the definition of the
107 GEI8 & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 140; Azubuike, supra note 63, at 49 (citing
authors); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea, 40 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1,
10 & n.28 (2007).
108 R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 22 (3d ed. 1999); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. V,
intro. note at 5 (1987).
109 Azubuike, supra note 63, at 49 (citing authors); Bahar, supra note 107, at 10 &
n.28.
110 GEla & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 140.
Ill Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 141 (noting that since the drafters of the Harvard Convention clearly did
not intend to define an international crime of piracy, it is unlikely that the drafters of the
1958 Law of the Sea Convention or UNCLOS intended such a major shift). For a recent
alternative view arguing that UNCLOS defines an international crime which could
potentially be included within the ICC's jurisdiction, see Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing
Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy Within the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 197, 203-04 (2010) [hereinafter Dutton,
Bringing Pirates to Justice] (noting that because UNCLOS defines the crime of piracy
and makes it subject to universal jurisdiction, it could become the basis of international
prosecutions); see also Roger L. Phillips, Direct Application of the International Law of
Piracy in Municipal Systems, COMMuNIS HOS'rs OMNIUM (Mar. 22, 2012), http://piracy-
law.com/2012/03/22/direct-application-of-the-international-law-of-piracy-in-municipal-
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substantive offense and its punishment is left to domestic criminal
codes, some of which rely on UNCLOS, and some of which
expand UNCLOS provisions or alter them.114 Others have read the
provision as declaratory of customary international law, defining
an offense against the law of nations."' This offense can be
punished in accordance with Article 105 of the Convention and,
presumably, there is an obligation upon states to incorporate the
provision (more or less wholesale) into their domestic law. 116
Article 101 of UNCLOS reads:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
systems/. This alternative view is likely also the official position of the IMO and the
UNODC, which speak of the "crime of piracy" as defined in UNCLOS, but are generally
careful to note that UNCLOS merely allows for national law to adopt its provisions and
define them as punishable crimes. See IMO, Circular Letter Concerning Information
and Guidance on Elements ofInternational Law Relating to Piracy, Annex, Uniform and
Consistent Application of the Provisions of International Conventions Relating to
Piracy, 21, IMO Circular Letter No. 3180, LEG 98/8 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter
Circular Letter], (comparing UNCLOS to the SUA and noting that "Article 105 of
UNCLOS is less prescriptive than SUA in that it empowers, but does not oblige, States
to provide for piracy to constitute a criminal offence under the national legislation and to
establish appropriate penalties"). When the option of an International Piracy Tribunal
under Chapter VII was discussed, the Secretary General merely reiterated that "[t]he
crime of piracy is well established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and customary international law and should not present a difficulty of
definition." Defining piracy itself as a threat to the peace, the theoretical establishment
of such a tribunal might change the status of the UNCLOS definition as an international
crime. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible
Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for
Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, Including, in
Particular, Options for Creating Special Domestic Chambers Possibly with International
Components, a Regional Tribunal or an International Tribunal and Corresponding
Imprisonment Arrangements, Taking into Account the Work of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Existing Practice in Establishing International and
Mixed Tribunals, and the Time and Resources Necessary to Achieve and Sustain
Substantive Results, 99, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010).
114 GElI& PETRIG,supra note 23, at 141-42.
115 See RuBIN, supra note 31, at 328 (noting that the language of the 1956 draft,
current Article 110, allows nations to "decide on the penalties to be imposed," implies
that the crime is defined by the convention itself, and "[p]resumably, the failure of a state
to conform its municipal law definition of piracy to that proposed by the Commission ...
would be considered itself as a violation by the state of its obligations under general
international law").
116 Id.
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depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed:
(i) on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraphs (a) or (b).117
The definition in Paragraph (a) is controversial for several of
its qualifying elements, which have been criticized as overly
narrow for an effective enforcement regime."' The elements of
the core offense of piracy have their source in the Harvard Draft,
a research effort organized in 1932, which was not a codification
of state practice, but rather de lege ferenda, as advisable
limitations on jurisdiction."9
In terms of the disputed language, the "private ends"
requirement has been disputed because it is based on a historic
rationale; it could, however, exclude all types of political acts.120
This dispute may have little relevance to Somali pirates, who are
largely apolitical.12' The "two ship requirement," in the words
"against another ship," could exclude all forms of mutiny and
hijacking,12 2 but does not exclude attacks carried from another
117 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101.
118 See Bahar, supra note 107, at 17 (discussing the application of the international
definition of offense to Somali pirates, and noting problems caused by three basic gaps
in the UNCLOS definition).
119 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 321 (noting how J.P. Frangois, the drafter of the
definition, viewed these limitations as "essential elements," even though they were taken
from the Harvard Draft); id. at 314-17 (noting basic weaknesses in the Harvard Draft).
120 Bahar, supra note 107, at 26-37 (arguing for the "minority view" that private
ends should only exclude governmental warships, not private actors, even if they are
terrorists acting for political ends).
121 GEIB & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 61-62 (noting, however, that there may be an
increasing tendency to use terrorist purposes as a defense to piracy charges).
122 Bahar, supra note 107, at 38-39 (arguing that the definition was only meant "to
exclude criminal acts by one passenger or crewmember against another" but not acts of
mutiny or hijacking).
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vessel, even a small skiff, and thus does not present too many
problems in the context of Somali piracy. 123  The "high seas"
requirement, on the other hand, is probably most problematic in
the Somali context, since it would exclude jurisdiction over any
acts committed within the territorial waters of Somalia or any
other state.124
However, little discussion has focused on the second and third
paragraphs of the definition.125 One reading of the definitional
article is that it defines a "core offense" with various "fringe
connections" of complicity: aiding and abetting in the form of
voluntary participation, being an accessory to the crime as a
facilitator, and inciting to commit the crime.126  Another
interpretation views cruising in a piratical vessel with intent to
commit piracy as a separate crime.127 While the first interpretation
allows for the prosecution of a large group of persons who
ultimately intend violent acts of piracy, the second may open the
door for conviction of a group of people who are simply present
on a vessel in close proximity to pirate "leaders" and lack any
intent at all.'28 The distinction between the two interpretations is
directly related to equipment articles for piracy convictions.
IV. The Problem with Universal Jurisdiction Over Piracy: The
Principle of Legality
Some argue that universal jurisdiction over piracy should be
denied for violating "the general acknowledgment today that all
crimes must be so defined by statute before they can be punished,
123 GE1B & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 62-63.
124 Id.; Bahar, supra note 107, at 25-26 (noting jurisdictional problem in territorial
waters).
125 See infra notes 205-218 and accompanying text.
126 See Circular Letter, supra note 113, at Annex 7 (interpreting UNCLOS
Articles 101(b) and (c) as criminalizing "acts preparatory to a full attack," including
"organizing, instigating, aiding and abetting, facilitating and counselling").
127 See id (noting that "criminalization of. . . acts [such as organizing, instigating,
aiding and abetting, facilitating and counseling] is vital to combating any kind of
organized crime, as not all of the criminals will be directly involved in carrying out the
act itself').
128 Cf infra note 488 (providing that "circumstances indicating an intent to commit
piracy" may be one factor that would complete the offense).
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nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege."l2 9 The principle
of nullum crimen has become accepted as part of customary
international law'30 and has been adopted by 162 of 192 of U.N.
Member States.'3 1 Most notably, it exists in the bills of rights of
Kenya,13 2 Seychelles,'33 the United Republic of Tanzania, 3 4 and
Mauritius,' all of which have been recruited to prosecute
piracy. 3 6 Each of these countries has adopted language similar to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which was
reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR): "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute
a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed." 3 7
129 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 343.
130 See KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009) (quoting Theodor Meron). Gallant explores the
development of the principle of legality from its origins, through the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals, into modem treaty law and international customary law. The problem is
different in the context of national prosecutions as opposed to international tribunals.
See id at 397. It is still doubtful whether defendants could raise a legality issue in
national proceedings. See id. at 397-98. Nonetheless, defendants might raise the issue
pursuant to treaty regimes (for example, in the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights), and the problems relating to equipment articles for piracy also may limit
the policy of the United Nations and its agencies, since the principle is binding on
international organizations promulgating a legal regime. See generally id. at 306-310
(describing the Secretary General's reports as opiniojuris).
131 See id. at 243-51.
132 CONSTITUTION, art. 77(4) (2010) (Kenya) (using language similar to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)).
133 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES, ch. 1, art. 19(4) (1993) (using
language similar to the ICCPR, but adding "[e]xcept for the offence of genocide or an
offence against humanity.").
134 TANZANIA CONST., art. 13(6)(c) (1977) (using language similar to ICCPR).
135 MAURITIUS CONST., ch. II, art. 10(4) (1968) (using language similar to ICCPR).
136 See, e.g., UNODC, Counter Piracy Programme: Support to the Trial and Related
Treatment of Piracy Suspects, 2 (July 2012) [hereinafter UNODC Brochure July 2012],
available at http://www.unode.org/documents/easternafrica//piracy/UNODC
Brochure Issue 9 Final webversion.pdf.
137 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. The principle of legality has developed differently in civil and common
law countries. Civil law codes generally require a stricter form of the doctrine and a
written law making the conduct a crime. Further, the law must be clear and specific in
its terms. Retroactive crimes and most forms of analogy are excluded. See CASSESE,
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The problem of legality in piracy convictions arises from
difficulty defining the applicable law. Rubin, who raised the
nullum crimen sine lege issue in his authoritative book on the law
of piracy, questioned the existence of an international law crime of
piracy and a public international law definition of piracy."'
Today, his claim seems inaccurate. The UNCLOS definition
of piracy has been widely accepted as customary international law,
uniformly accepted by the U.N. and its organs and agencies,13 9 and
adopted as the official definition in several instruments among
regionally affected states, including: the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 140 the Djibouti Code of Conduct,"' and
numerous Memoranda of Understanding. 142  The UNCLOS
definition has also been imported nearly verbatim into the penal
codes of several countries.'4 3 Moreover, Kenya and Seychelles
have both conducted several prosecutions based on universal
jurisdiction, applying UNCLOS language in domestic law; other
supra note 75, at 37-38. Common law systems adopt a more qualified approach, at least
as applied to common law offenses-which allow for analogy and judge-made law-but
still generally require the existence of a law applicable to the actor at the time of the act.
Additionally, the law must have been sufficiently clear to make punishment foreseeable.
International criminal law has been developing towards a doctrine of strict legality, in
large part as a result of the ratification of human rights treaties, and the gradually
expanding network of international criminal law conventions. Id. at 38-41.
138 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 343-44. In his opinion, there was probably never an
agreed international law of piracy, and there were very few examples in which universal
jurisdiction had been used. Id. In those few cases, universal jurisdiction was most likely
based on a projection of British naval power, and not a true international consensus.
139 See infra notes 241-243 and accompanying text.
140 See Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) art. I, 2, Nov. 11, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 829, available at
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/O/docs/About ReCAAP ISC/ReCAAP Agreement.pdf
(applying UNCLOS definition of piracy).
141 See IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf ofAden (Djibouti Code
of Conduct), Annex, at 8, art. 1, Apr. 3, 2009, 1 1, IMO Doc. C/102/14, available at
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoCEnglish.pdf [hereinafter
Djibouti Code of Conduct] (applying UNCLOS definition of piracy); id art. 11
(requiring national legislation to adopt the definition).
142 See, e.g., GEIS & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 276 (adopting the definition of piracy
"as defined in Article 101 of UNCLOS" into the EU - Kenya Transfer Agreement).
143 See infra notes 313-319 and accompanying text.
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regional states will soon join with trials of their own.14 4
Regardless of its origins, today there is a true international law of
piracy sufficient to address the problem of legality.
However, criminal piracy trials still present unique legality
problems because they involve modem applications of absolute
universal jurisdiction with no nexus to the prosecuting state. The
nullum crimen principle requires that, in universal jurisdiction
prosecutions, international law must provide the notice of the
crime, and make it accessible and foreseeable to defendants.145
Additionally, there must be "some criminal law that binds the
person at the time of the act."1 46 But nullum crimen is not only a
problem of non-existent law, it is also a right of defendants to a
clear law, accessible and foreseeable as a source of
prosecutions. 147
Notice of an applicable law involves "qualitative requirements,
notably those of accessibility and foreseeability."l 48 UNCLOS, as
144 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
145 See WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
NATIONAL COURTS 236-48 (2006) (noting problems of accessibility and foreseeability
with regard to national prosecutions of core international crimes- war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide).
146 See GALLANT, supra note 130, at 371. UNCLOS is not a binding criminal law.
See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text. This is perhaps the primary reason
why the IMO and UNODC insist that UNCLOS define a "crime of piracy" even though
it is clear that there must be national implementation-to reiterate that individual
criminal liability arises on the international level even before the defendant is brought to
the prosecuting state. Arguably, however, a vague criminal norm of piracy jure gentium
would be sufficient. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS 98 (2008) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW]("ICL Conventions frequently fail to satisfy the requirements of
positivist legal systems, but not those of the more flexible ones. But, this difference is
not relevant when ICL is applied through the indirect enforcement system, because in
that approach national legal systems incorporate the ICL norm into their domestic
criminal law, and thereby satisfy their respective requirements of 'legality' . . . The
problem, however, arises with respect to the direct enforcement system, where ICL
norms are applied by an international criminal tribunal.").
147 See GALLANT, supra note 130, at 11-12 (providing some rules that make up the
"principle of legality of crimes and punishments" and are associated with the nullum
crimen principle).
148 C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 33 (1995). The European
Court of Human Rights was applying the principle under the European Convention, and
concluded that a retroactive abolition of the defense of marital rape was "foreseeable."
Id. TT 34-38; GALLANT, supra note 130, at 219-22 (agreeing with Ferdinandusse that the
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a codification of customary law, would appear to meet these
requirements. UNCLOS is broadly accessible to individuals,
particularly in light of the publicity surrounding the piracy
phenomenon. 149 The Convention also provides notice of
applicable law and foreseeability of punishment because of its
widespread use as a definition of piracy and its consistent
promulgation through the IMO and other U.N. agencies.' In
addition, while UNCLOS itself does not proscribe the offense or
provide punishment for acts of piracy, it allows states to do so.'
Many prosecuting states use its provisions nearly verbatim.'5 2
The legality problems of UNCLOS, however, center on the
vagueness of UNCLOS itself, which is not yet resolved by
sufficient case law or clarification in national legislation.' A
court may not, according to stricter provisions of legality of the
ICCPR, create a new crime with a new actus reus or a new mens
rea, although it may reasonably interpret existing provisions.' If
court overextended the doctrine of foreseeability); see also S.W. v. United Kingdom,
335-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 43 (1995) (slightly tempering the statements of the court
in C.R. v. United Kingdom).
149 See FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 145, at 236-37 (noting that traditionally
accessibility is the duty of states, though a number of courts have found it to be satisfied
where there is a treaty in force, and that such issues are diminished with "the advent of
the information age"). It is difficult to imagine that the UNCLOS definition is not
immediately accessible with its extensive repetition of on piracy-related websites. Thus
the law does not present problems of accessibility, even though pirates are not heads of
state, or even state actors, and not necessarily aware of treaties. See 22 TRIALS OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 462
(International Military Tribunal ed., 1948), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NT Vol-XXII.pdf (arguing that planners of
war of aggression "must have known of the treaties signed by Germany").
150 Id.; see also infra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
151 FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 145, at 294-295 (noting four main problems of
foreseeability: the lack of a classic prohibition in available sources, the plurality of
divergent sources, vagueness, and the interplay between national and international rules).
The nature of UNCLOS and the Somali piracy problem may solve the first two issues,
because UNCLOS is the only treaty applicable in cases of universal jurisdiction and is
applied consistently.
152 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
153 See RUBIN, supra note 31, at 344 (providing that the definition of "piracy" is
confusing, that precedents regarding "piracy" are weak, and that the "only legal
definitions of 'piracy' exist in municipal law . .. that do not represent any universal
'law' . . . [and that] rest on national policies").
154 See CASSESE, supra note 75, at 45-46 (citing Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct.
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UNCLOS is only being interpreted by domestic courts in their
penal codes incorporating its provisions, then there is probably no
problem of legality."' On the other hand, if consistent state
practice is to punish only violent acts of piracy, or even attempts at
such violent acts, a regional state which decided to enact
equipment articles and punish cruising for piracy would in effect
be creating a new crime.156 Such a crime, although based on
UNCLOS Article 101, would have a new actus reus and mens rea,
and would neither be accessible nor foreseeable to defendants."'
Prosecutions based on this new law would be contrary to the
nullum crimen principle.'
A. Accessibility and Foreseeability in Practice: Ambiguities
in UNCLOS 101(b) Operation of a Pirate Ship Affecting
the Scope of the Clause and its Application
As discussed above, the "fringe offenses" in the UNCLOS
definition can have at least two reasonable interpretations. The
first is to interpret Article 101(a), acts of depredation, as a core
crime, and Articles 101(b) and 101(c), voluntary participation in
operation of a ship and facilitation, as forms of accomplice
liability.15 Under the first interpretation, this would include all
aiders and abettors who intend the ultimate crime be committed,
H.R. 33-35 (1996)) (arguing for the proposition that foreseeability allows for the
interpretation of the existing ingredients of a crime, but not for the creation of a new
actus reus or mens rea, which is not reasonably foreseeable to defendant); see also
Mohamed Shahabudeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive
Development of the Law? 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1017 (2004) (analyzing case law
from the ECtHR and the ICTY, and concluding that the principle of nullum crimen does
not bar development of the law through clarification, "provided that the resultant
development is consistent with the essence of the offense and could reasonably be
foreseen").
155 See CASSESE, supra note 75, at 45-46.
156 Cf id (providing that a development of law that is inconsistent with the
"essence of the offence" and that could not "reasonably be foreseen" would essentially
create a new actus reus or mens rea, and that such creation is not allowed).
157 See id, at 45-46 (arguing that a new actus reus or mens rea would not be
foreseeable to the defendant).
158 See Shahabudeen, supra note 154, at 1017 (noting that nullum crimen principle
would be consistent with the development of the law "provided that [it] .. . could
reasonably be foreseen").
159 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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and accessories who intend to assist, but not those who simply are
cruising for potential crimes.16 The second interpretation views
101(b) as a distinct form of offense-cruising for piracy-that
encompasses all foreseeable violent offenses that might result. 16 1
This would make cruising a crime of its own and all accessories to
that crime would be equally punishable.162
The first interpretation is assisted by Section (c), facilitation,
which refers to "any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating
an act described in subparagraphs (a) or (b)."l 63 Section (c) is thus
seen as a secondary crime to Sections (a) and (b). If this is so,
then Section (b) should be piracy in its own right, supporting the
second interpretation. Moreover, the opening of Article 101
suggests that it lists several forms of piracy.164 The crime of
cruising is, thus, likely to be part of piracy under the plain
interpretation of UNCLOS.
In a hypothetical scenario, if an international tribunal were
applying UNCLOS as the basis of a customary law crime, it would
be possible to argue that, although the law of piracy in UNCLOS
is customary law and binding upon states, the international
criminal law norm binding individuals is substantially narrower.165
It would be unfair to subject individuals to punishment for
offenses that have not become a part of the punishable criminal
law norm of piracy, such as cruising for piracy.'66 This
conclusion, when applied to criminal prosecution in national
courts, is relevant in the sense that it affects the rights of
defendants under the legality principle, and it may also be relevant
if the extent of universal jurisdiction should be limited to the
160 See id
161 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
162 id
163 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101(c).
164 Id. art. 101 (providing a definition of piracy by listing several possible acts).
165 Cf Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 12 (May 31,
2004) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (providing protection for children from parties to a
conflict).
166 Cf Shahabudeen, supra note 154, at 1013 (noting that nullum crimen principle
is a "principle of justice" that requires the developed law "retain the essence of the
original crime").
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definition of the offense under international law.167
For core human rights crimes, "in recent practice, arguments
about a lack of foreseeability have systematically been dismissed,
predominantly on the basis of the manifest illegality ....
Thus, for example, "[i]t is undeniable that acts such as murder,
torture, rape and inhuman treatment are criminal according to
'general principles of law' recognised by all legal systems." 69
Similarly, slavery has been found to be a "natural crime."'
Some forms of piracy that fall under UNCLOS Article 101
may not be manifestly illegal. This is especially true if cruising is
a distinct form of piracy. Since setting foot on board a ship with
pirate equipment is not clearly illegal,' 7 ' it is unforeseeable to
167 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also ALEXANDER ZAHAR &
GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 494-96
(2008) (citing Hof's-Gravenhage 23 Dec. 2005, LJN 2005, AU8685 6.3
(Prosecutor/Frans van Anraat) (Neth.), translated in http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
detailpage.aspx?ljn=AX6406 ("Exceeding the liability limits of international criminal
law, when a case is brought to trial under national law, could cancel the international
basis for universal jurisdiction, while the latter can only be applied to practices that are
indictable as criminal offenses under international law.")). The Dutch court concludes
that if Dutch law allowed for complicity in genocide with a lower level of intent than that
required by international law, the Dutch court could not apply Dutch law without losing
its universal jurisdiction. Hof's Gravenhage, 6.5.1.
168 FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 145, at 241 (and cases cited there).
169 Prosecutor v. Delali6 (Celebici Case), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment,
313 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
170 FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 145, at 241.
171 A hypothetical example, which is personal opinion based on facts that are
probably similar to actual cases, was provided to me by Matthew Williams, law clerk to
Judge Duncan Gaswaga, Supreme Court of the Seychelles:
Let's say I'm a young Somali man. I've been offered a job by a family friend
who lives on an island off the coast and asked to bring some of my friends. The
job is [to] help him build a house. The construction materials are on site, but
I've been asked to bring some ladders. I don't have much money so I buy these
cheap hooked ladders down by the dock. I'm renting a large boat to ferry us to
the island, but I am bringing a skiff so we can get anything else we might need
from the mainland like food and water. I find six friends who want work. I
load my ladders into the larger boat and my six friends. The captain of the boat
who has agreed to ferry me and friends has also agreed to tow the skiff. Two of
my friends have brought AK-47 rifles that they carry for self-defense and the
captain has two more AK-47s and some ammunition on the ship. We set out to
sea and are confronted by a British warship with a helicopter.
E-mail from Matthew Williams, Law Clerk to Judge Duncan Gaswaga, to author (July
24, 2012, 5:59 PM) (on file with author).
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declare it punishable under UNCLOS Article 101(b) and to make
cruising itself piracy, even where the intent of those in control is to
attack should an opportunity present itself.172 Such prosecutions
must be avoided to "prevent the prosecution and punishment of an
individual for acts which he reasonably believed to be lawful at
the time of their commission." 73
Other arguments that have been used to deny that
foreseeability defenses do not apply to pirates. Pirate
crewmembers do not hold positions of authority'7 4 and cannot be
expected to obtain legal advice before action. 7 1
The next section will examine how the simple meaning of the
Convention is applied to reasonable uncertainty regarding the
offenses included in piracy, particularly the offense of cruising;
how state domestic laws of piracy are inconsistent in punishing a
preparatory offense; and how there are, as yet, few if any
prosecutions of the preparatory offense of cruising for piracy.
With regard to Articles 101(b) and (c), UNCLOS leaves unclear
the range of punishable conduct, which can only be clarified by
the developing practice of states.176 These uncertainties relate to
the elements of the offense, the mens rea required, the location of
the offenses and the types of acts prohibited.
1. Intent or Knowledge?
The core definition of piracy in Article 101(a) does not address
the subjective element of the acts using classic words of intent
such as willfully, or knowingly.'7 7  The first direct references to
intent are in Article 101(b), which requires "knowledge of facts
making [the ship] a pirate ship," and Article 101(c), which
requires "intentionally facilitating. Read simply, the
172 Id
173 Celebici Case, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 313.
174 See Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court art. 28(a)(i), July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (setting a "should have known" standard for military commanders).
175 See Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (1996) (finding duty to seek
legal advice); see also Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 323-B Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1995).
176 See supra note 153-154 and accompanying text.
177 See CASSESE, supra note 75, at 92-93 (interpreting several conventions'
requirements of intent).
178 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101.
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knowledge requirement of Article 101(b) involves awareness of
the circumstances forming part of the definition of "pirate ship."l7 9
The definition of "pirate ship" is in Article 103:
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101.
The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit
any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the
persons guilty of that act."'
Thus the awareness must include knowledge of the intent of
the chief perpetrators. If Article 101(b) is read together with
Article 103, the intent required is only that of the persons in
dominant control.8"' The persons committing a voluntary act of
participation must only have awareness of that intent. 182  The
difficulty with this interpretation is that, if the persons in dominant
control of the ship intend to use it for piracy but have not yet acted
so as to make that intent clear, there is no way to identify a ship as
a pirate ship.'8 ' The facts may be existence of equipment on
board, which is proof of such an intent, or may indicate that
voluntary participation only occurs after an attack has begun or
ended.'84
An additional problem is that operation of a pirate ship is
effectively a crime without intent. Participation in the operation of
a ship does not directly involve the intent to commit piracy; rather,
it merely indicates knowledge and awareness of the facts relating
to the ship.' Acts of assistance during attempted violent acts, on
179 CASSESE, supra note 75, at 62.
180 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 103 (emphasis added).
181 See CASSESE, supra note 75, at 60-64 (providing that intent is required for most
international crimes and that the "accomplice need not share the mens rea of the
principal").
182 See CASSESE, supra note 75, at 63-64.
183 See GEI8 & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 65.
184 See infra note 482 (discussing how this problem relates to involuntary induction
of minors aboard ships); infra note 488 and accompanying text; supra note 6.
185 This problem was carefully avoided in the most recent Seychelles case by
attributing a common purpose of intent to commit piracy. See Jama, Judgment, 1 56,
Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012) (Seychelles) (on file with author) (convicting
the accused individuals for operation of a pirate ship, but emphasizing that all aboard
must have had intent to commit piracy, because no one alleged they were present
involuntarily, and there was significant circumstantial evidence). However, it should
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the other hand, necessarily involve some intent to aid and abet.18 1
2. Pirate Ship
A second ambiguity with regard to Article 101(b) is its use of
the word "pirate ship." Article 103 is circular because it defines
"pirate ship" as a ship intended to commit any of the acts of
Article 101, which includes the voluntary operation of a pirate
ship, if "acts" is interpreted to include Article 101(b)."' Thus,
some suggest limiting the Article 103 language, "one of the acts
referred to in Article 101," to the acts committed in Article 10 1(a),
such as a violent attack."' However, this interpretation is not in
the text, and some criminal codes implementing the provision
specifically include voluntary participation in the operation of a
facilitating ship or an inciting ship, widening the scope of Article
103 to all acts of Article 101.189
A reading that narrows Article 103 to ships intended for illegal
acts of violence would also give piracy two different meanings in
the Convention: piracy resulting from a violent attack (Article
101(a) only), and other "nonviolent" forms of piracy, including
crew and facilitators.'90 This distinction might mean that the right
of visit in Article 110191 and the right of arrest in Article 105192 are
only applicable to violent piracy. It might also mean that Article
101(b) only applies to crew who assist a violent attack, but not
arguably be sufficient for conviction if the common purpose is operation of a ship.
186 Id
187 GElI3 & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 64.
188 Id at 65. This is also the language used in the Harvard Draft Convention on
Piracy, supra note 69, at 742-43 ("A ship is a pirate ship when it is devoted by the
persons in dominant control to the purpose of committing an act described in the first
sentence of paragraph I of Article 3.").
189 See infra notes 313-318 and accompanying text.
190 See GEI8 & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 65.
191 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 110 (noting that a ship may board another ship if
there is "reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy").
192 Id. art. 105 ("[E]very State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates."). Furthermore, Article 105
allows arrests of everyone on board a pirate ship, and seizure of all property on board "a
ship ... taken by piracy and under the control of pirates." Id Since the acts of attempt
and facilitation do not result in the taking of a ship, "piracy" is most likely again used
only in the limited sense of 10 1(a) acts of attack. See GE & PETRIG, supra note 23, at
66.
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those who assist cruising.
3. No High Seas Requirement
Paragraphs 101(b) and (c) are not limited to the high seas, and
do not need to be committed on board a ship.193 Potentially, these
crimes could be committed on land or in territorial waters.19 4 If So,
it is unclear if they would be subject to universal jurisdiction under
UNCLOS.195 By the terms of UNCLOS Article 105, jurisdiction
to try the offenders would only exist if they were captured on the
high seas:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates,
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.196
The second sentence of Article 105 is generally interpreted to
provide for universal jurisdiction over piracy."' It has also
provided some support for the principle of limited universal
jurisdiction, which would allow only the seizing country's court to
judge pirates.'98 At any rate, such universal jurisdiction exists only
193 GEla & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 64-65.
194 See id
195 See Azubuike, supra note 63, at 53 (providing that "[u]nder UNCLOS, pirates
could be pursued from the high seas, but the right of hot pursuit ended once they entered
the territorial waters of any State").
196 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 105.
197 Id.; GEIM & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 66 (noting that all persons on board may be
arrested regardless of whether they have been involved in piracy); Azubuike, supra note
63, at 54 (noting that universal jurisdiction is a fairly undisputed aspect of piracy, and it
is retained by Article 105); Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 40, at 111
(2001) ("This article clearly establishes universal jurisdiction [over piracy.]"); see also
Circular Letter, supra note 113, Annex, IMO Doc. 98/8/1 7 (citing Article 105 as basis
for universal jurisdiction over piracy). For a recent application of the provision in state
practice, see Rb. Rotterdam 17 juni 2010, NJ 2010, LJN: BM8116, 230, translated in
http://www.unicri.it/maritime piracy/docs/Netherlands 2010 CrimNo_10_6000 12_0
9 Judgment.pdf [hereinafter Samanyolu Judgment].
198 See Ryan P. Kelley, Note, UNCLOS, but No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to
the Prosecution ofMaritime Piracy, 95 MiNN. L. REV. 2285, 2297 (2011) (noting support
in drafting convention notes that "this provision gives any state the right to seize
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for persons found on board a pirate ship or a seized vessel on the
high seas.199 If so, most acts falling under Article 101(c) as
facilitation or incitement would not be subject to universal
jurisdiction.2 00
B. The Preparatory Drafts of UNCLOS - Some Clarification
Relating To UNCLOS 101(b)
In 1924, the Assembly of the League of Nations began the first
modem effort to codify the crime of piracy by requesting that the
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law address the subject.2 0 ' A first report, prepared
by M. Matsuda of Japan, and M. Wang Chung-hui of China, was
submitted on January 26, 1926 and circulated to governments
202three days later for their comments. The report explicitly
defined piracy as a crime of cruising, where piracy consisted of
"sailing the seas for private ends without authorization from the
Government of any State with the object of committing
depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons. 203
Article 101(b), in its current form, has its source in the
Harvard Draft, a separate research effort that developed in
response to the League of Nations effort. 20' The principle
pirates .. . and have them adjudicated by its courts").
199 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101(a).
200 See Jon Bellish, A High Seas Requirement for Piracy Facilitators Under
UNCLOS?, CoMMUNIs HosTrs OMNIUM, Aug. 18, 2012, http://piracy-
law.com/2012/08/18/a-high-seas-requirement-for-pirate-facilitators-under-unclos/
(discussing whether the high seas requirement should limit prosecution of piracy under
Article 101(c) of UNCLOS). See also Jon Bellish, A Second Avenue to Assert Universal
Jurisdiction Over Negotiators, CoMMUNIS HoSTIs OMNIUM, Aug. 25, 2012, (arguing
that an ex ante agreement to negotiate with pirates who have successfully hijacked a
vessel, even if concluded from land, may also be sufficient for the high seas
requirement). This last argument has no application to convictions for operation of a
pirate ship.
201 See RUBN, supra note 31, at 305-08 (describing process of creating the report,
and citing to its chief articles).
202 Id
203 Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law,
Report by the Sub-Committee, League of Nations Doc. C.48.M.25 (1926), A.1
available at http://www.fortunes-de-mer.com/mer/images/documentspdf/legislation/
Internationale/Piraterie/SDNI926C.48.M.25.1926(C.D.P.I.58)_Piracy.pdf.
204 See RUBIN, supra note 31, at 308-13 (describing origins of the Draft and theory
behind its preparation).
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language of the provision on "operation of a pirate ship" did not
change much between the development of the Harvard Draft and
the 1982 UNCLOS 101(b).205 J.P.A. Frangois, the Special
Rapporteur appointed by the International Law Commission,
incorporated six articles dealing with piracy into his 1954 draft
Regime of the High Seas; his definition of piracy was simply a
French translation of the Harvard Draft.20 6 On the first day of
discussions, the definition inspired much debate among members
of the Commission relating to whether piracy should include acts
committed for political ends or sponsored by a state,2 07 acts
committed with a desire for gain (known as animus furandi),20 8
acts committed in territorial waters or on land,20 9 or acts
committed only between multiple vessels (the "two-ship
requirement").2 10 There was, however, little to no debate as to
whether acts of participation in the operation of a ship should be
included among "acts which were liable to prosecution by the
authorities of any State, even if the interests of that State were not
at stake."2 11
On the second day of discussion, Frangois proposed dropping
205 Compare Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, art. 3, 2 ("Any
act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making
it a pirate ship."), with Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 15, 2, Apr. 29, 1958,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention 1958] ("Any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it
a pirate ship or aircraft."). See also UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 101(b).
206 RUBIN, supra note 31, at 319 (citing Sixieme rapport de J. P. A. Frangois,
rapporteur special, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/79,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/
ILC_1954_v2_e.pdf The English version of the relevant Article 23 definition is
available in the Seventh Session, 290th Meeting, 12 May 1955, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 37, 39 & n.1 [hereinafter Seventh Session], available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc//publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1955 vle.pdf.
207 Seventh Session, supra note 206, at 37-39 (disusing whether Chinese warships
committed piracy against Poland); id. at 43-44, 55-57 (discussing a suggestion by Sergei
M. Krylov of the U.S.S.R. to include state piracy, based on an interpretation of the Nyon
Agreement prohibiting unauthorized submarine warfare); see also RUBIN, supra note 31,
at 320.
208 Seventh Session, supra note 206, at 39-40 (statement of M. Frangois, Special
Rapporteur).
209 Id. at 41, 43 (statement of M. Georges Scelle (France)); see id. at 52-53.
210 Id. at 41-42; see id. at 53.
211 See id. at 39.
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the second and third sections from the definition "since they dealt
with details of international penal law,"212 and the purpose of his
report was only to lay down the main principles of a regime of the
high seas.2 13  A similar proposal, omitting acts of operation of a
pirate ship and facilitation, was proposed by Douglas L. Edmonds
of the United States. 214  A.E.F. Sandstrom of Sweden suggested
expanding the definition of piracy to include mutiny on board a
ship with intent to use that ship for piracy.2 15 In discussing what
types of acts committed by crew or passengers aboard a vessel
"transformed it into a pirate," Scelle of France observed that "it
was not vessels but persons who became pirates."2 16 Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom noted that "it was only after
an act of piracy had been committed that the vessel became a
pirate," and on that basis disapproved of Sandstrim's draft "since
the purpose of seizure of a ship by crew or passengers could not be
known until their subsequent action provided evidence." 2 17  The
difficulty with this position is it would also seem to exclude acts of
voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship before any
violent acts have been committed. Thus, it is possible Sir
Fitzmaurice read the draft report to refer to participation in the
operation of a pirate ship while, or after, it had committed violent
acts. While no vote was recorded, it appears that Fitzmaurice's
view was adopted.2 18
212 Seventh Session, 291st Meeting, Friday, 13 May 1955, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 44, 44 (statement of Mr. Frangois, Special Rapporteur).
213 See id
214 Id.
215 Summary Records of the 292nd Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51,
51-52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1955 v1_e.pdf.
216 Id. at 53.
217 Id. at 53-54.
218 See RUBIN, supra note 31, at 322-23 & n.134 (noting that a previous case held
the opposite-that piracy was any seizure of a ship for a felonious purpose-but not
requiring proof that the ship was taken for purposes of depredations at sea); Att'y Gen.
of H.K. v. Kwok-a-Sing, (1873) 5 L.R.P.C. 179, 199-200 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
H.K.) (demonstrating that it would be strange to argue one could be liable for operating a
pirate ship that had not been seized but not for seizing a ship by mutiny). This places
greater importance on intent for future acts than actual acts and emphasizes again that
piracy is not about the severity of the crime, but about crimes that fall within a technical
jurisdictional definition. Another alternative is that Sir Fitzmaurice was referring to a
proposal that did not include the second and third parts of the definition.
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The Harvard Draft authorizes prosecution where there is
"lawful custody;" the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea
suggests the definition of piracy is the actual law to be applied.219
This suggestion is consistent with the theory of the Harvard Draft,
which viewed the international law of piracy as simply defining
jurisdiction, but not as a substantive crime:
Properly speaking, then, piracy is not a legal crime or offense
under the law of nations. In this respect it differs from the
municipal law piracy which is a crime by the law of a certain
state. International law piracy is only a special ground of state
jurisdiction-of jurisdiction in every state. This jurisdiction
may or may not be exercised by a certain state. It may be used
in part only. How far it is used depends on the municipal law of
the state, not on the law of nations. The law of nations on the
matter is permissive only. It justifies state action within limits
and fixes those limits. It goes no further.220
The implications of this theory are evident in the clauses on
"operation of a [pirate] ship," and facilitation, which-according
to comments on the Draft-were added simply for
"convenience." 2 21  These clauses serve two purposes: first, they
provide a more complete enforcement regime to prevent attacks
(including raids planned from the high seas but directed towards
the coast), and second, they serve as "a ground of jurisdiction to
prosecute when the evidence of a certain person's participation in
particular outrages is not sufficient." 2 2 2 There is no analysis of the
substantive criminal law of accessories.223
Cruising for piracy is included within piracy jurisdiction based
on two academic sources, both of which mention it more as
suggestion than law: "[i]t is doubtful whether persons cruising in
219 Compare Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, arts. 6, 11
(defining lawful custody and authorizing prosecution under state law), with High Seas
Convention 1958, supra note 205, art. 19, at 84 ("On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon
the penalties to be imposed.").
220 See Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 759-60.
221 See id at 820-22.
222 See id at 820.
223 See generally id. (lacking any analysis of accessories under this criminal law).
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armed vessels with intent to commit piracies, are pirates or not."2 24
The writer further notes that his hypothesis
is founded on the absence of any express authority for the
affirmative of the proposition, and on the absurdity of the
negative. If a Queen's ship were to fall in with an armed vessel
belonging to no state, and obviously cruising for piratical
purposes, would the commanding officer hesitate to seize that
vessel because it had not actually taken a prize? It seems equally
difficult to suppose that the vessel would be permitted to escape,
or that it could lawfully be arrested if the crew were not
221
pirates.
He then cites piracy acts of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, which suggest pirates are "a known class of persons ...
and that a man may be a pirate though he has never actually
robbed." 226  The argument is weak because the piracy acts cited
tend to apply the legal consequences of piracy to treason,
suggesting that the connotation of pirates as a class of persons was
used to denote illegal political activity rather than robbery at
sea.2 27 The suggestion that cruising for piracy is a piratical act is
consistent with British naval practices used to deal with rebels in
the nineteenth century.22 8
224 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS) 75 (4th ed. 1887).
225 Id. at 74 n. 1. Note also the suggestion of one writer that a crew of mere
pleasure-seekers who reject the authority of all states and sail under no flag could also be
arrested as pirates. Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 776.
226 STEPHEN, supra note 224, at 74 n.l. See also Piracy Act, 1721, 8 Geo., c. 24, § 1
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/db 1804/19870112-
2295/pdf/db_1804.pdf (making it an offense to trade or barter with pirates, and
"deem[ing]" a person a pirate without robbery); Piracy Act, 1698, 11 Will., c.7, §§ 8-9
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/db_1805/19870112-
2296/pdf/db_1805.pdf (deeming a master of a ship to be a pirate if he "betray[s] [the
admiral's] trust").
227 See RUBIN, THE LAW OF PRIACY, supra note 31, at 210 ("In view of the use of
the word 'piracy' in England to bring about the legal results of treason in the 1690's, and
the continuance of the statute of 1700 ... it is not surprising that the word 'piracy' was
felt to have broader legal meanings than the strictly historical one in English law relating
to robbery within the jurisdiction of the Admiral."); id. at 101 & n.123 (noting various
laws of "petty treason").
228 See id. at 213 (describing Robinson's application of the criminal law concept of
"piracy" to allow military action against ethnic Greek insurgents); id. at 223-24
(describing a "pirate-hunting" expedition by James Low, a British official, in 1826,
aimed at ousting Kedah Udin who had allegedly been involved in depredations at sea
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Furthermore, the Harvard Draft makes clear that cruising for
piracy only allows for jurisdiction over a pirate ship when "it is
being devoted to piratical purposes."2 29 Abandonment of the
piratical purpose before any attack will grant immunity from
seizure, but if the ship has already been used for an act of piracy, it
cannot lose its character as long as it remains in dominant control
of the persons who committed those acts.230 This same rule should
apply under UNCLOS if the provision criminalizes accessories,
since it is consistent with general international law on criminal
attempt as well.2 31 Thus, pirates who are captured on the high
seas, but surrender without any conflict, could often raise an
abandonment defense.232
In sum, several conclusions can be made from the preparatory
drafts, which do not fully resolve the issues of ambiguity raised
above. First, Frangois appears to have understood that Sections 2
and 3 of the definition were modes of liability, and not separate
233
crimes.23 This interpretation is also supported by the
near Penang); id. at 226-29 (describing how Norris eventually acquits Mohamed Saad,
the deposed Sultan of Kedah, from a charge of piracy because he is deemed to be acting
for public ends, but that marauders cruising for private ends can be attacked at sea,
shifting the focus out of the courts); id. at 235 ("Even an independent state may, in my
opinion, be guilty of piratical acts. What were the Barbary pirates of olden times? What
many of the African tribes at this moment? It is, I believe, notorious, that tribes now
inhabiting the African coast of the Mediterranean will send out their boats and capture
any ships becalmed upon their coasts. Are they not pirates, because, perhaps, their whole
livelihood may not depend on piratical acts? I am well aware that it has been said that a
state cannot be piratical; but I am not disposed to assent to such dictum as a universal
proposition." (quoting The Magellan Pirates, 1 Spink Eccl. & Adm. (Eng.) 81, 83-84
(1853))).
229 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 823.
230 Id. at 822-24.
231 See Kai Ambos, individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 475, 488-90 (Otto Triffterer
ed., 1999) (discussing the ambiguity between attempt and commission but clarifying that
once a crime is committed, there is no undoing of it).
232 See Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 823 ("If the pirate
ship has made no piratical attack, its piratical character will be dissipated by a definite
abandonment of piratical purposes.").
233 See Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37,
39-42 & 39 n.3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc//publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC 1955 vle.pdf (discussing Frangois'
Article 23 as defining only one illegal act-piracy-to be committed through a number
of different acts).
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Netherlands, which suggested getting rid of the term "pirate ship"
altogether, clarifying the distinction between pirate ship for
purposes of seizure and accomplice liability.234 On the other hand,
the fact that these suggestions were not accepted may support the
view that voluntary operation of a ship, or cruising for piracy, is a
separate crime.
The International Law Commission, in its comments on the
final draft, noted that "[a]cts committed on board a vessel by the
crew or passengers and directed against the vessel itself, or against
the persons or property on the vessel cannot be regarded as acts of
piracy." 2 35 This interpretation was said to "tall[y] with the opinion
of most writers," 2 36 and although the Dutch government reached a
different interpretation, it did generally agree with the
conclusion.2 37 However, the strict interpretation of the two-ship
requirement overlaps with attempted piracy to some degree-if
mutineers can be defended from a piracy charge because they have
not yet committed piracy, then operation of a ship with intent,
before any violent acts, should also not be criminal.
V. State Practice and Opinio Juris Relating to UNCLOS
101(b) - Operating a Pirate Ship
The definitions of piracy in UNCLOS are widely accepted as
the customary international law definition of piracy, and thus are
binding on all states.238 However, as mentioned above, it is both
less clear and more controversial whether these norms create
individual criminal responsibility and whether the nature of piracy
obligations qualify as ajus cogens norm. Since customary law is
created both by state practice and opinio juris regarding that
234 See Netherlands, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 62, 65, U.N. Doc.
A/CNA/99/Add.1, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc//publications/yearbooks/
Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1956 v2 e.pdf.
235 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 19, 25, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 19, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add.1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc//publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1955-v 2 _e.pdf.
236 Id.
237 See Netherlands, supra note 234, at 64 ("The Netherlands Government are,
however, of the opinion that the view of the Commission is correct.").
238 See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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practice,239 it is useful to examine state practice in prosecuting
pirates and state laws defining piracy. Based on this examination,
an argument can be made that the customary law norm creating
criminal liability for individuals is substantially narrower than the
broadest interpretation of UNCLOS. This argument is based on
the fact that actual prosecutions, and many state laws, appear to
confine liability or limit universal jurisdiction to situations where
there is an actual violent attack.240
Today, efforts to prosecute Somali pirates have shown some
measure of success, and there are currently close to 1100 Somali
pirates undergoing prosecution.2 41 These efforts have gone hand-
in-hand with attempts to review national legislation and revise
domestic penal codes to match the UNCLOS definition. All U.N.
bodies, particularly the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations with
responsibility for the safety and security of ships, officially
espouse the full definition of piracy as listed in Article 101,
including operation of a ship and facilitation.2 42 In addition, the
General Assembly and the IMO have been acting to review
national legislation and have requested that states adopt the
UNCLOS definition into the national criminal code definitions of
piracy.243 The Office of Legal Affairs of the UN, the IMO, and the
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have
239 See generally Comm'n on the Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l Law, Int'l
Law Ass'n, Final Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation of General Customary International Law, 69 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. OF CONFS.
712, 717 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-
92D6-4CFA-A6 1 C4CA30217F376 (demonstrating how state law and opinio juris are
both referenced in this area of law).
240 See infra Table 2.
241 See id.
242 See Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Against
Ships, at 3, (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.imo.org/
KnowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopics/PiracyandArmedRobberyagai
nstShips/Pages/default.aspx (follow "Information Resources on PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS).
243 See G.A. Res. 64/71, 72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/71 (Mar. 12, 2010) ("Calls
upon States to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the
apprehension and prosecution of those who are alleged to have committed acts of




EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PIRACY
"prepared guidance documents on the elements of national
legislation ... [and] the implementation of' the international law
regime of piracy.24 4 In addition, the current Security Council
resolutions on piracy all affirm that "international law, as reflected
in UNCLOS" set out the "legal framework applicable to
combating piracy.",24 5
Several regional agreements have also been concluded,
emphasizing the need to review national legislation and to
implement crimes that match the UNCLOS definition.24 6 The
Djibouti Code of Conduct, adopted on January 29, 2009, expressly
incorporated the UNCLOS definition of piracy, with Sections (b)
and (c), and required regional states to review their "national
legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are national
laws in place to criminalize piracy. . . .,,247 That definition is now
implemented by eighteen regional signatories. 248 The more recent
Security Council resolutions also embody this obligation.249
A. A Review ofNon-Conforming Legislation
As of January 2011, a number of states had undertaken the
legislative process of adapting their law to combat piracy, most
notably Belgium, France, Japan, Maldives, Seychelles, Spain, and
244 Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1950, T 65, U.N. Doc. S/2011/662, (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter SG
Report Oct. 2011], available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/Ni1/544/11/PDF/N1154411.pdf. See Circular Letter, supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
245 See sources cited supra note 24.
246 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
247 See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 141, art. I (defining "piracy"); id. art.
11 (requiring states to move toward adopting UNCLOS statutes).
248 IMO, Status of the Implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, at 1, (July
21, 2011), available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/
Djibouti%20Code%20Update.pdf.
249 See S.C. Res. 1976, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res.
2015, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011). Interestingly, this request to
thoroughly review and reform the law is softened or absent in two of the latest
resolutions, leaving regional states to assume a "leadership role." See S.C. Res. 2020, IN
14, 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011) (emphasizing traditional bases of
jurisdiction and calling states to criminalize piracy and implement UNCLOS); S.C. Res.
2039, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 (Feb. 29, 2011) (stating that "states in the region
have a leadership role to play" but not mentioning legislative changes).
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the United Republic of Tanzania.250 A recent survey of domestic
laws criminalizing piracy by Professor Yvonne Dutton suggests
that there is still quite a bit of divergence from UNCLOS
definitions of piracy in national legislations.25 1 Dutton outlines
several relationships of national piracy crimes to the definition in
UNCLOS: some jurisdictions have incorporated the UNCLOS
provisions in their substantive definitions of the crime of piracy,
with a greater or lesser degree of divergence.2 52 Some only
reference their treaty obligations in combating piracy, but do not
incorporate the substantive provision.25 3 Other states have simply
left the definition to the law of nations.254 Several other states
define piracy without reference to UNCLOS-some predate the
Convention, while others suggest reinterpretation of its
provisions. 255 Dutton concludes there is still some difference of
opinion as to the core offense of piracy, and the extent to which it
should be subject to universal jurisdiction.2 56
For an analysis of national piracy laws whether they have
incorporated universal jurisdiction (UJ), see Table 1 at page ##.
2. UNCLOS Article 101(b) Omitted: Liberia, Somaliland
Nations adopting the UNCLOS definition of piracy use
language identical or similar to Article 101 to create a domestic
crime that is punishable as piracy. Thus, the UNCLOS treaty
regime of cooperation on the high seas is almost identical to a
municipal criminal norm, and piracy is the same for purposes of
enforcement and criminal jurisdiction.25 7 This appears to be the
preferred approach of UNODC and the IMO and is gradually
being adopted by regional states of the Gulf of Aden.25 8
250 Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, 1 47.
251 See generally Yvonne M. Dutton, Maritime Piracy and The Impunity Gap:
Insufficient National Laws or a Lack of Political Will?, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1111 (2012)
[hereinafter Dutton, Impunity Gap] (discussing the variations of piracy law among the
jurisdictions).




256 See id. at 1152.
257 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
258 See Mohammed Al Qadhi, Yemen Tries Suspected Pirates, THE NATIONAL,
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According to these states, all of Article 101, including operation of
a pirate ship, falls under the international crime of piracy, allowing
for universal jurisdiction over operation of a pirate ship and
facilitation when committed by any person anywhere. 25 9 Thus, the
laws of the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Seychelles
incorporate UNCLOS Articles 101 through 103.260 Malta also
defines piracy similarly to UNCLOS, but appears to require some
nexus to the offense. 261' Kenya and Tanzania have recently
amended their laws to follow UNCLOS but omit "high seas" from
the definition, suggesting that piracy may be committed in
territorial waters.262 The revision of the laws of these states, and
(Sept. 30, 2009) http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/yemen-tries-
suspected-pirates (explaining that Yemen does not have a piracy law, but considers it to
be a form of banditry and has also tried it as terrorism).
259 See Law on Combating Piracy, Law No. 52/2012 (Piracy Law), 2012
(Somaliland); Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1141 & tbl. 2.
260 The U.K. law incorporates Articles 101 to 103 of UNCLOS, thus preserving the
circular reference to pirate ship (potentially including facilitating ships), and the
ambiguity regarding mens rea of participants in the operation of a pirate ship (i.e.
knowledge versus intent). The Seychelles law also preserves the circularity of the
definition of pirate ship (§ 65(5) referring to all acts in (4)), and hence the ambiguity of
mens rea, but clarifies that it refers to all acts and addresses attempt, incitement, and
facilitation in § 65(3) separately from the core definition of piracy and pirate ships. Core
piracy is subject to absolute universal jurisdiction and presumably facilitation,
incitement, and attempt are as well. See infra notes 398, 441, and 463 and accompanying
text. The South African law omits the term pirate ship, thus avoiding both problems.
Compare UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 101-03, with Merchant Shipping and Maritime
Security Act, 1994, c. 28, § 26, sch. 5 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/28/pdfs/ukpga 19970028_en.pdf and Defense
Act 42 of 2002 § 24 (S. Afr.) and Penal Code (Amendment), (2010) § 65 (Seychelles),
available at http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/0/50/29/09/Docs-Textes/
CodePenalSeychellesAmend-Seyl10031 1.pdf to see how similar these laws are.
261 See CRIMINAL CODE, 2009, §§ 328N-3280 (Malta) (assigning jurisdiction only
over acts committed on Maltese ships, against Maltese ships, or by Maltese nationals).
262 See Merchant Shipping Act, (2009) § 369 (Kenya) (omitting "high seas" from
the definition of piracy); id. § 371 (punishment for the offense); Republic of Tanzania
Penal Code, Cap. 16, § 66 (Tanz.), available at
http://polis.parliament.go.tz/PAMS/docs/ll-2010.pdf (as amended by THE WRITTEN
LAWS (MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS) (No. 2) 2010 (following UNCLOS definition, but
omitting "high seas" and clarifying that pirate ship must be intended for violent acts)).
Mauritius has recently committed to prosecuting piracy cases beginning June 2012, and
has adopted a new law that includes the "high seas" requirement. See Piracy and
Maritime Violence Act, 2011, art. 3, § 3(a)(i) (Mauritius), available at
http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/webattomey/file/39of2011 .pdf.
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those of Seychelles, has been undertaken as part of the effort to
combat piracy in Somalia and to facilitate prosecutions, with
significant promises of financial assistance from the European
Union.263
However, Liberia and Somaliland, which incorporated the
UNCLOS provisions, specifically reject the inclusion of
"operation of a pirate ship" within the definition of the crime.
Liberia omits both Article 101(b)-operation of a ship, and Article
101(c)-facilitation, suggesting the narrower interpretation of
UNCLOS above.2 65 The Somaliland law provides for a crime of
"[a]ny act of willful participation in an act directed knowingly as a
pirate's attack against a private ship or private aircraft."2 6 6 The
notes on the Act make clear that this language diverges from
UNCLOS and indicate that the offense of "going equipped" to a
crime is not punishable under Somaliland law; there is no criminal
provision covering the separate offense of 101(b).26 7
1. UNCLOS 101(b) as a Separate, Lesser Offense
A number of jurisdictions define an offense parallel to 101(b)
but specifically provide for a lesser punishment, suggesting that
the offense, while punishable, should be treated with less severity.
Australia creates two offenses: an act of piracy including only the
definition of UNCLOS 101(a), punishable by life in prison; and
operation of a pirate ship, punishable by fifteen years
imprisonment.2 68  Japanese law, which defines piracy without
263 For a good survey of this topic from someone directly involved in the process
who argues that regional courts are the best location for prosecution of pirates and
addressing recent legal changes in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to facilitate
prosecutions, see Milena Sterio, Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: The Argument for
Pirate Prosecutions in the National Courts of Kenya, the Seychelles, and Mauritius, 42
AMSTERDAM LAW FORuM 104, 112-19 (2012), available at
http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/view/264/456.
264 See Law on Combating Piracy, Law No. 52/2012 (Piracy Law), 2012
(Somaliland); Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1146 & n.167.
265 See Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1146 & n.167; Penal Law, 1956, §
15.31 (Liber.).
266 Law on Combating Piracy, Law No. 52/2012 (Somaliland), art. 2 (footnote
omitted).
267 See id. at 2 & n.2.
268 Crimes Act 1914, pt IV, § 51 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/aullegis/cth/consolact/cal91482 (interpreting "act of piracy"
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UNCLOS but mirrors its provisions, provides a punishment for
preparatory acts such as breaking into a ship or operating a pirate
ship that is potentially equivalent to those for violent "acts of
piracy." 269  Japanese law also distinguishes between "operating
and approaching in close proximity of' another ship or simply
"preparing weapons and operating a ship" for the purposes of
piracy.270
As discussed above, it is unclear whether the language of
Article 101(b) defines a mode of liability similar to aiding and
abetting or whether it is a separate preparatory offense.2 7 1 Two
distinctions might be the degree of punishment and the attempted
"operation of a pirate ship." Some commentators have written that
Article 101(b) is designed to be a catchall including any acts of
attempt and conspiracy with intent to commit piracy.272 However,
there is no obvious reason to define attempt in relation to a vessel
or to use language which narrows the definition of attempt because
an attempt can be "assimilated to piracy" under Article 101(a).273
If UNCLOS Article 101(b) defines such attempt, it would appear
to exclude other lesser forms of attempt. This problem was
addressed by the Special Adviser on piracy, who suggested that
domestic legislations expand on UNCLOS provisions on attempt;
Seychelles followed this suggestion in its amendment.2 74
If Article 101(b) is a separate crime, UNCLOS is silent on the
issue of attempt, leaving it to the definitions of domestic law.275
and "pirate ship" and jurisdiction); id. §§ 52-53 (punishing acts of piracy with life in
prison and operation of ship with 15 years).
269 See infra note 508, and accompanying text.
270 See id.
271 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
272 See Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, T 59;
Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1158 (noting that the Lang Report suggests
that nations define attempt more broadly than UNCLOS, but that a number of states have
not done so).
273 See 3 MYRON H. NORDQUIST ET AL., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 202 (Satya n. Nandan & Shabti Rosenne eds., 1995)
("'Attempts' at piratical acts are not included within the definition, but could be
assimilated to piracy.").
274 See infra notes 508 and 516.
275 See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 146 and
accompanying text (implying that domestic law must fill in the gaps where international
lawmakers remain silent).
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This second interpretation may be more in line with the Japanese
implementation of UNCLOS, which includes operation of a pirate
ship as piracy, while clarifying that there is no attempted operation
of a pirate ship, and Australian law, which has two separate
offenses: one for "acts of piracy" and one for "voluntary
participation in the operation of' a pirate ship (both allow for
universal jurisdiction).276  Belgian law also uses the UNCLOS
language to include operation of a pirate ship as piracy itself and
expressly punishes attempt and preparation for operation of a
pirate ship.277 Other jurisdictions, which incorporate UNCLOS
verbatim, are less clear regarding attempted operation of a pirate
ship, but they all agree that universal jurisdiction is proper over all
crew.278
2. Piracy Under the "Law OfNations, " Not Necessarily
Including Operation of a Pirate Ship
Other jurisdictions have retained laws defining piracy by
reference to the "law of nations." These include the United
States,279 Canada,28 0 New Zealand,2 81 and Singapore.28 2 Both
Israel283 and the Bahamas punish piracy and crimes "akin to
piracy" but do not define the offense, nor refer specifically to the
276 See supra note 268 and accompanying text, infra note 508 and accompanying
table.
277 See Loi relative A la lute contre la piraterie maritime [Piracy Act] of Dec. 30,
2009, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 14, 2010, art. 3(b) and
(c).
278 See supra note 260 and accompanying text; infra notes 502, 510 and
accompanying table.
279 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
280 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, art. 74, § 1 (Can.), available at
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf ("Every one commits piracy who does any
act that, by the law of nations, is piracy.").
281 Crimes Act 1961 (N.Z.), pt. 5, §§ 92-97, available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1961/0043/latest/DLM327382.html (punishing
"every one ... [who] attempts to do any act amounting to piracy by the law of nations.").
282 Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act, 1849, c. VIA, § 130B, cl. 1 (Sing.) ("A
person commits piracy who does any act that, by the law of nations, is piracy.").
283 See Letter from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the U.N. to the Secretariat of
the U.N., at 2 (Feb. 22, 2010) (quoting Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 169 (Isr.)), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ISR antijpir
acy.pdf ("A person who commits piracy or any act connected with or akin to piracy is
liable to imprisonment for twenty years.").
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law of nations.2 84 The Bahamian Penal Code also provides that
persons committing piracy "shall be liable to be tried and punished
according to the law of England for the time being in force."
Similar provisions existed in The Republic of Tanzania 286  and
Seychelles 28 7 before recent revisions to the law; the older
Seychelles law was applied in the first two universal jurisdiction
cases to punish piracy jure gentium.28 8 In Seychelles, the court
determined that the "Law of England" that was "in force at the
time" for purposes of punishing piracy in Seychelles was the Law
of England in force at the time of the signing of the Seychelles
law, not at the time of the acts of piracy, and the court punished
piracy jure gentium.289 Many of these codes were based on the
Queensland Code, also known as the Griffith Model Penal Code,
adopted in many former British Colonies, 290 but it is unclear if the
law contemplated the exercise of universal jurisdiction over
piracy.291
284 See id.; see also PENAL CODE, c. 84, § 404 (Bah.), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/BHS_penal_c
ode.pdf.
285 PENAL CODE, C. 84, § 404 (Isr.), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/BHSpenal_c
ode.pdf.
286 PENAL CODE, 1945, Cap. 16, § 66 (Tanz.), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5de0.html (last amended 1963) ("Any person
who is guilty of piracy or any crime connected with or relating or akin to piracy shall be
liable to be tried and punished according to the law of England for the time being in
force.").
287 PENAL CODE, c. VIII, § 65 (Seychelles), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d67afc82.html ("Any person who is guilty of
piracy or any crime connected with or relating or akin to piracy shall be liable to be tried
and punished according to the law of England for the time being in force.").
288 See Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Dahir & Ten Others ("Topaz"), Judgment, TT
34-36, Crim. Side No. 51 of 2009, (July 26, 2010) (Seychelles) (explaining how the
Supreme Court of Seychelles has jurisdiction in the case over defendants).
289 See id. 48 ("According to established principles and case law, the phrase 'for
the time being in force' would refer to the law in force up to the 29th June, 1976 when
Seychelles attained independence from Britain.").
290 See, e.g., Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note 69, at 425 ("The Nigerian and
Kenyan Penal Codes were descended from the Queensland Criminal Code.").
291 See id. at 426-28 (noting that Justice Griffith himself did not envision piracy
prosecutions in the colonies, but that Kenya has interpreted its statutes in line with an
early series of commonwealth cases that construed their statutes as embodying universal
jurisdiction).
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Laws that rely on "the law of nations" or international law to
define the offense present problems of nullum crimen sine lege,
since a defendant may not be on notice of the crimes for which he
is punished.292 This may be a broader problem in domestic
jurisdictions following a stricter textual requirement of notice.
Even in jurisdictions that require only notice of the substance of
the crime, lack of notice is a barrier for prosecution of crimes that
may fall outside the core definition of piracy.29 3 Thus, Judge
Jackson of the District Court of Eastern Virginia found that a
prosecution for attempted piracy would violate due process as an
unconstitutional judicial expansion of criminal law because, under
U.S. precedent, piracy required the successful seizure of a ship or
acts of robbery, and the defendant was not on notice that he could
be hauled into court for unsuccessful piracy, since the alleged
wrongful actions did not necessarily fall under "piracy as defined
,,294cm etaoshv1ciiieby the law of nations. Several commentators have criticized
the decision for not accepting a settled definition of piracy that
includes attempt.295
Judge Davis, writing in the same court two months later, found
that UNCLOS was settled customary law of piracy, and therefore
satisfied due process, because the law clearly put defendants on
292 See Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1152.
293 See id. at 1152 ("More broadly, corollary legislative and interpretive principles
require that criminal statutes be drafted with some specificity, be strictly construed, and
that any ambiguities be resolved in favor of the accused. The purpose of these principles
is to ensure the legality of criminal law so that individuals are on notice of proscribed
conduct and are protected against arbitrary and oppressive state action.").
294 United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 566-67 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated,
680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
295 See Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Pirates in National Courts: U.S. v. Said and
Piracy Under US. Law, EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/prosecuting-pirates-in-national-courts-us-v-said-and-piracy-
under-us-law/ (arguing that international law on piracy is clear, and the lesson to national
jurisdictions is to update their definitions). Another critique is based on the problem of
originalist interpretation of U.S. law. Compare David Glazier, How to Define Piracy
(Cont'd): A Critique of U.S. v. Said, OPINIo JuRIs (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/08/18/how-to-define-piracy-contd-a-critique-of-us-v-said/
(arguing that the ambiguity in the piracy legislation will only be perpetuated by courts),
with Kevin Jon Heller, The Chickens Come Home to Roost - U.S. v. Said, OPIMNo JURIS
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/08/19/the-chickens-come-home-to-roost-us-
v-said/ (observing that the ambiguous language allows courts to be necessarily flexible to
adapt the piracy legislation to new situations).
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notice that their conduct was unlawful, and any conduct falling
within the definition was punishable as a crime.296 Judge Davis
established at length that "the crime of piracy," as defined by
UNCLOS, is customary law, and proceeded to read the provisions
of Article 101 as though they were written into the U.S. criminal
statute. 297 This interpretation was affirmed on appeal.2 98 However,
the UNCLOS definition in Article 101 is not binding criminal
law.2 9 9 For UNCLOS to genuinely put defendants on notice that
their conduct is criminally punishable, there must be a generally
accepted interpretation of its defined crimes and a custom that all
conduct falling within its broad scope is actually punishable in
national courts.3 00 Especially for "fringe offenses" such as
operation of a pirate ship, which is generally not prosecuted on its
own, defendants may not be on notice of liability.3 01
The Kenyan High Court of Mombasa's 2010 decision in
Mohamud M Hashi v. Republic30 2 also demonstrates how the
nullum crimen principle may require courts to distinguish between
UNCLOS Article 101 and piracy convictions under the law of
nations.303 The prior Kenyan law, repealed in 2009, read, "[a]ny
person, who, in territorial waters or on the high seas,.commits any
296 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 640-42 (E.D. Va. 2010)
("Defendants were fairly warned of the potential criminal liability they faced for their
conduct.").
297 Id. at 640-641. Judge Davis also notes that the word "illegal" in UNCLOS
Article 101, as in "any illegal acts of violence or detention," is synonymous with
violence, and thus a harmless redundancy. Id. at 640 n.33. He seems to suggest that it
may serve as a reminder that all acts of violence are unlawful, and defendants are on
notice of such unlawfulness; unless, they make a claim of legal rights, thus satisfying due
process. Id. This is similar to the argument that prosecution is foreseeable for all malum
in se crimes, thus satisfying the nullum crimen principle, but this argument may not hold
for UNCLOS Article 101(b). See supra notes 145 and 165 and accompanying text.
298 United States v. Dire, No. 11-4310, at *41-42 (4th Cir. May 23, 2012)
(affirming the Eastern District Court of Virginia).
299 See generally Ambos, supra note 231 for insight into why the principle of notice
in criminal law can be problematic.
300 Id.
301 See id. at 491 (articulating one argument for why crimes without an definite
beginning point create serious issues for defendants).
302 See In re Mohamud Dashi & 8 Others, (2010) eKLR 1, at *18 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya), available at kenyalaw.org/DownloadsFreeCases/78571.pdf.
303 See id. at *18, *25-29.
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act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the offence of piracy."3 04
The High Court held that the repeal, which was absolute and had
no transitional provision, created a gap in legislation since the
prior law was now non-existent and could not be used for
convictions, while the new law, which incorporated UNCLOS,
could only be applied to cases after its enactment.305 Therefore,
pending cases under the old law would have to be dismissed.30 6
The court also held that piracy jure gentium was distinct from the
statutory definition mirroring UNCLOS Article 101, and thus, the
new law was a substantive change.30 7 The High Court decision
implied that international criminal law distinguishes between
piracy jure gentium and UNCLOS piracy; conduct made criminal
under the new law following UNCLOS may not necessarily have
been criminal under the prior provision because the applying court
"was obligated to find and determine its ingredients through other
interpretive sources[,] e.g. [d]ictionaries, texts and precedent."3 08
This decision was recently overturned by the Kenyan Court of
Appeal, which held that the new law simply updated piracy jure
gentium to match UNCLOS."'
3. Jurisdictions Referencing Treaty Provisions with No
Definition of the Offense
Jurisdictions that reference UNCLOS but do not specifically
incorporate its provisions into domestic law may also face
problems when prosecuting crimes of piracy due to a lack of
clarity and formalism.3 '0  The IMO recently raised this problem
regarding French law, which cites UNCLOS but does not include
its substantive provision, noting that "this generic approach may
304 See id at *18.
305 Id. at *25-29.
306 Id. at *25-29.
307 Id. at *26-27.
308 In re Mohamud Dashi & 8 Others, (2010) eKLR 1, at *26 (H.C.K.) (Kenya),
available at kenyalaw.org/DownloadsFreeCases/7857 1.pdf.
309 In re Mohamud Dashi & 8 Others, (2012) (C.A.K.) at *38-40 (Kenya),
available at http://piracylaw.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/kenya-hashi-appeal-
opinion.pdf.
310 See Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1154-55 (providing examples
from Senegal and France in which national courts rejected direct application of
international crimes that had not been specifically implemented into domestic law).
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present obstacles for adequate prosecution and punishment in
countries where criminal law requires as a condition for
enforcement that all elements of the offence are described in detail
in the legislation." 3 11
4. Jurisdictions Defining the Offense without Reference
to UNCLOS
Among jurisdictions that do not refer to UNCLOS as the basis
of their definition, the crime of operation of a pirate ship may not
allow for universal jurisdiction. For example, by including the
crime of mutiny, the Philippines Revised Penal Code appears to
punish piracy more broadly than the UNCLOS definition;
however, it does not mention operation of a pirate ship or
facilitation as criminal conduct.3 12
The Netherlands, which has laws on piracy significantly
predating UNCLOS, defines the offense of piracy as "a person
who enters into service or is serving as a master of a vessel,
knowing that it is intended for or using it for the commission of
acts of violence against other vessels on the high seas . . ."; the
crime for a crewmember is similar, but the punishment is a
maximum of nine years imprisonment instead of twelve. 3 A
person who commits such an offense "is guilty of piracy.""
Separate offenses exist for equipping a pirate vessel and indirectly
or directly facilitating the hiring of a pirate vessel.315 The
Netherlands' Penal Code allows for absolute universal jurisdiction
311 See Frangois LeSieur, Commentaire sur la Nouvelle Loi Frangaise Relative a la
Lutte contre la Piraterie et a L'Exercice des Pouvoirs de Police de I'Etat en Mer, 4 J. E.
ASIA & INT'L LAW 115, at 118 & n.11 (2011) (citing IMO, Piracy: Review of National
Legislation, 7.2, IMO Doc. LEG 96/7 (Aug. 20, 2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/201 0/10/IMO-Legal-Committee-Note-and-
Report-on-Review-of-National-Legislation-on-Piracy.pdf) (describing a stricter positivist
form of the nullen crimen principle.).
312 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 7659, § 3 (1993) (Phil.), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ral993/ra 7659_1993.html.
313 DUTCH PENAL CODE, art. 381 (Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth trans., 1997)
(1996).
314 Id.
315 Id. §§ 383-84.
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for piracy. 316
Indonesian law, possibly influenced by the Dutch code,
includes as a crime in open-seas piracy the acts of "the person who
enters into service or serves as a shipper on a vessel, knowing that
it is destined to be used or is used to commit acts of violence in the
open sea."3 1' The Indonesian Penal Code provides for universal
jurisdiction over piracy.' The Indonesian and Dutch definitions
of piracy mirror the crime of voluntary operation of a pirate ship in
UNCLOS Article 101(b).
B. Current State Practice In Exercising Universal
Jurisdiction Over Inchoate Crimes ofPiracy
This section briefly surveys prosecutions of Somali pirates
since 2006, and then addresses the regional piracy prosecutions in
Kenya and Seychelles, which are important because of
jurisprudence on universal jurisdiction, attempted piracy
convictions and cruising for piracy convictions under UNCLOS
Article 10 1(b).
A recent report by the Secretary General shows that as of
October 25, 2011 over 1,000 suspected pirates had been
prosecuted or were awaiting prosecution in 20 States .... The
prosecutions are a result of increased apprehension of suspected
pirates with improved gathering and preservation of evidence,
enhanced information-sharing, strengthened legislative
frameworks in some States, and increased political willingness
316 A.H.A. Soons & J.N.M. Schechinger, The Netherlands Country Report for the
CIL Research Project on International Maritime Crimes, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2011), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/201 0/1O0/Country-
Report-Netherlands.pdf.
317 PENAL CODE OF INDONESIA, c. XXIX, arts. 438, 445-46 (1999), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html (including operating, equipping or
insuring such a vessel, and expressly extending jurisdiction for such acts on the high
seas). See also Sari Aziz & Ranyta Yusran, Indonesia's Country Report for the CIL
Research Project on International Maritime Crimes, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2011), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Country-
Report-Indonesia.pdf (noting that it remains unclear whether the Indonesian Code
captures the UNCLOS definition of piracy).
318 See Aziz & Yusran, supra note 317, at 17 (noting that under Article 4(4), the
Indonesian Penal Code provisions on piracy apply to any person, including foreigners
outside Indonesia).
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319to undertake prosecutions.
For a summary of how twenty different countries have
addressed or intend to address pending prosecutions of pirates, see
Table 2, at page ##.
1. Non-Regional States
Non-regional states usually prosecute pirates only when
national interests are involved; therefore, pirates caught without
connection to an attack are generally not prosecuted.32 0 The
unwillingness of states to pursue criminal prosecutions has led to
the release of almost ninety percent of the suspected pirates caught
by coalition warships.32 1
A survey of non-regional prosecutions of piracy shows that
most cases involve attacks on ships or nationals of the prosecuting
state. In November 2011, France tried six men for attacking a
private yacht, the Carre d'As, and holding a couple ransom for $2
million; five pirates received sentences between four to eight
years, and one was acquitted.32 2 Another case, decided in June
2012, involved the attack of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant,
and resulted in four convictions between four to ten years, and two
acquittals.3 23 Two other pending cases also involve attacks on
French private vessels and French victims. 3 24 The German trial of
ten pirates accused of seizing the MV Taipan, a German registered
319 SG Report Oct. 2011, supra note 244, 58.
320 GEIB & PETRIG, supra note 23, at 30-31.
321 See Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, IT 14,
41, 43-44, 59.
322 See Paris Court Convicts 5 Somali Pirates, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9972941; Somali Pirates Jailed in France
for Kidnapping Couple, BBC NEWS AFRICA, Nov. 30, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 15976883 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
323 See Valerie Gabard, Somalis Pirates on Trial in France: 4 Year Long Pre-trial
Detention Creates Evidentiary Hurdles, COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM, June 21, 2012,
http://piracy-law.com/2012/06/2 1/somalis-pirates-on-trial-in-france-4-year-long-pre-
trial-detention-creates-evidentiary-hurdles/.
324 Id; See Somali Pirates Jailed in France for Kidnapping Couple, supra note
322. See also Rachel Lindon, The Mistreatment of Somalis Accused of Piracy,
COMMUNIs HoSTIS OMNIUM, Sept. 10, 2012, http://piracy-law.com/2012/09/10/the-
mistreatment-of-somalis-accused-of-piracy/ (describing, as attorney for some of the
remaining accused, an uphill battle for human rights guarantees during pre-trial
detention).
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ship, has just been concluded in Hamburg after 105 days of trial
and two years;32 5 the adults were sentenced to six or seven years
each, and the juveniles under 21 years of age at the time were
sentenced to two years with time served. 3 26  Both the French and
the German trials involved successful attacks, and apparently do
not rely on universal jurisdiction.
Belgium also recently prosecuted its first pirate, who was
convicted and sentenced to ten years in June 2011 for an attack on
a Belgian vessel in 2009.327 The pirate was captured during an
attempted attack in November 2010 of a Sierra Leonean vessel,
but was identified by the crew of the previous vessel who was held
hostage for sixty-eight days until a 2 million euro ransom was
paid; his fingerprints were also found on the Belgian vessel.328
The Spanish case involved the kidnapping of thirty-six Spanish
nationals for forty-seven days where the two captured pirates
attempted to flee the scene; both received high sentences.3 29 Five
more violent attackers on a Spanish warship may face trial in
Spain soon.330
325 See Ready to Prosecute? Suspected Pirates on Trial in Hamburg, RECLAIM THE
SEAS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://reclaim-the-
seas.blogspot.com/2012/02/ready-to-prosecute-suspected-pirates-on.html. Three minor
defendants were eventually released from pretrial custody because no one was harmed in
the attack, and no direct violence was used. For insight into the human rights aspects of
the case, see Beate Lakotta, German Justice Through the Eyes of a Somali Pirate,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, July 4, 2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/torture-execution-german-justice-through-the-
eyes-of-a-somali-pirate-a-755340-4.html.
326 Tim Ren6 Salomon, Long Road to Justice - The German Piracy Trial,
COMMUNIs HoSTIS OMNIUM, Oct. 21, 2012, http://piracy-law.com/2012/10/21/long-road-
to-justice-the-german-piracy-trial/.
327 See Belgium's First Piracy Prosecution - But Right to Bear Arms Remains
Controversial, OCEANUS LIvE, Jan. 11, 2012,
http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000394; Pirate to Face Trial in
Belgium: Defence Ministry, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE: AFRICA, Dec. 9, 2010,
http://www.mw.ni/africa/bulletin/pirate-face-trial-belgium-defence-ministry.
328 See First Somali Tried for Piracy in Belgium Denies Charges, ABS CBN NEWS,
June 15, 2011, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/06/15/1 1/first-somali-
tried-piracy-belgium-denies-charges.
329 See Somali Pirates Sentenced to 439 Years for Hyacking Spanish Fishing Boat,
THE GUARDIAN, May 3, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/03/somali-
pirates-sentenced-439-years.
330 See Five Somalis Detained in Spain After Alleged Navy Attack, EU BusINEss,
Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/spain-africa-piracy.eoj.
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Italy has recently ordered the prosecution of nine pirates
captured by the Italian navy after hijacking an Italian flagged
cargo ship, the Montecristo, while the crew locked themselves in
the hold for twenty-four hours until they were rescued by U.S. and
British troops. 33 ' The suspected pirates face up to twenty-year
sentences if convicted.3 32
All of the U.S. cases concluded to date involved attacks on
U.S. ships.333 The Netherlands has also prosecuted pirates where
the victims bore a relationship to the Netherlands, although
technically applying universal jurisdiction.334
While neither the Netherlands nor the United States appear
willing to prosecute pirates with no connection to the forum, the
Dutch cases may have significance for prosecutions under
UNCLOS Article 101(b), because of the nature of Dutch law,
which punishes a crime similar to cruising with intent to commit
piracy.3" The U.S. cases are significant for future prosecutions
under UNCLOS that extend its provisions beyond current practice
because they delve deeply into the question of the evolving nature
of the definition of piracy.33 6
Some regional countries also have effectively pursued non-
regional policies and have prosecuted mainly where there is a
nexus to the prosecuting state. Although it accepted some
international transfers in 2009, Yemen has since chiefly
prosecuted pirates who have attacked Yemeni ships and
331 See High-seas Drama at Somali Piracy Trial in Italy, AL ARABIYA NEWS, May
16, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/15/214326.html.
332 See Brandon Gatto, Italy Court Orders Trial for Accused Somali Pirates,
JURIST.ORG, Feb. 21, 2012, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/02/index_2012_02_21.php.
333 See Major Achievements in the Courtroom, supra note 84.
334 See Kenneth Mansuma, Prosecuting Pirates in the Netherlands: the Case of the
MS Samanyolu, 49 MIL. L. & L. WAR REv. 141, 146-47 (2010) (describing universal
jurisdiction in the Netherlands cases). See also infra note 507 and accompanying table.
335 See DUTCH PENAL CODE, supra note 313, art. 381; Rb. Rotterdam, 17 June 2010,
LJN: BM8116, at *10-11, available at
http://www.unicri.it/maritime_piracy/docs/Netherlands_2010_CrimNo 10 6000 12_0
9%20Judgment.pdf (discussing charge of "entering into service" as a pirate, which may
sometimes occur on land).
336 See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming the
district court's application of UNCLOS while recognizing that international law is
constantly "expanding").
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crewmembers.33 7 It sentenced six pirates to death and six
additional pirates to ten-year sentences in May 2010, as well as
ordering compensatory damages to the owner of the ship, and
restitution to the families of two Yemeni crewmembers killed in
the attack.3 Prosecutions in United Arab Emirates and Oman
have also involved national interests. 339
While it is unlikely to find non-regional prosecutions for
merely operating a ship, a number of prosecutions have involved
unsuccessful attacks and attempted piracy. Two recent high
profile cases in the United States and the Netherlands have
involved attempted piracy. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia used a narrow domestic definition of piracy
under the law of nations, holding that attempt was excluded and
therefore the suspect must be acquitted. 34 0 The Rotterdam district
court of the Netherlands, on the other hand, held that the pirates
who were intercepted by the Danish navy while attempting to
attack the Samanyolu could be prosecuted. It held that "the wide
definition in Dutch law focuses on the act of violence towards
other ships to constitute 'piracy,' [and is] much more in line with
the UNCLOS definition, whether the act is successful in robbing
the other vessel or not." 34 1
2. Regional States
On the other hand, regional prosecutions can be potentially
instructive on prosecutions under Article 101(b) (or domestic
parallels), since regionally affected states increasingly have
committed to accepting pirates for prosecution where no nationals
are victims. 342  Although only three such transfers occurred in
2011,343 the UNDP and UNODC predict that with the combined
337 See, e.g., Sarah Miley, Yemen Court Sentences 6 Somali Pirates to Death,
JURIST, May 18, 2010, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/05/yemen-court-sentences-12-
pirates-6-to-death.php.
338 Id.
339 See infra notes 527-529 and accompanying table.
340 See United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2012).
341 Mansuma, supra note 334, at 151.
342 SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, T 1.
343 Id. 6 & n.8. See C.J. Chivers, Somali Suspects in Hyacking of lranian Ship
Face Piracy Trial in Seychelles, NY TIMEs, Mar. 6, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/africalsomalis-on-iranian-ship-face-piracy-
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efforts of Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles, the United Republic of
Tanzania and Mauritius, along with international assistance, it
would be possible in two years to prosecute 125 cases, or about
1250 pirates, a year.34 4  A large number of prosecutions involve
arrests by regional authorities that lead directly to prosecution,
without transfer.34 5 As these regional hubs for the prosecution
develop, it is likely that there will be prosecutions even where
there are no known victims and the pirates are merely operating a
ship with intent to commit piracy.
3. Kenya Piracy Prosecutions
Kenya was the original forum for universal jurisdiction over
Somali pirates, with its first case in 2006.346 Republic v. Hassan
M Ahmed and Nine Others3 47 involved the hijacking of the Safina
al-Bisarat, an Indian registered dhow3 48 roughly 300 miles off the
coast of Somalia on January 20, 2006.349 The arresting ship
belonged to the U.S. Navy, and none of the victims were
Kenyan."o The case was heard in the Chief Magistrate's Court of
Mombasa, an ordinary criminal court of first instance."' The
Defense argued that the court had no jurisdiction to try the accused
charges-in-seychelles.html (reporting recent transfer arrangement of 15 suspects from
U.S. Naval custody).
344 SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, 124.
345 SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, 55 (noting that only three cases of eight
in Seychelles involved transfers, and the rest were arrests by the Seychelles Coast
Guard). It should be noted that almost all prosecutions currently occurring in Somaliland
and Puntland involve arrests by the Somali authorities themselves. See Legal Issues
Related to Piracy off the Coast ofSomalia, supra note 2, T 101-106. Since these trials do
not yet conform to international standards, no transfer agreements have been concluded.
SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, 24, 34.
346 See James Thuo Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates
Captured by Third States under Kenyan and International Law, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 363, 363-65 (2009), [hereinafter Gathii, Jurisdiction].
347 Republic v. Hassan Mohamud Ahmed, (2008) L.R.K. Crim. No. 434 of 2006
(High Court at Mombasa) (Kenya).
348 Hassan M. Ahmed v. Republic, [2009] eKLR (Kenya), 2, available at
http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_previewl.php?link=2923545236222747520635 1.
349 Id.
350 See id. (explaining that "American Navy officers" intercepted "Indian crew
members").
351 See Gathii, Jurisdiction, supra note 346, at 367-74.
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for piracy because piracy is an offense defined by UNCLOS, and
Kenya lacked implementing criminal law.3 52 The court dismissed
the arguments and held that jurisdiction was proper because
UNCLOS does not supersede the penal code, but merely
"amplifies" it. 53  It then convicted and sentenced each of the
accused to seven years imprisonment.3 54 In Hassan M Ahmed v.
Republic,3 5 5 the High Court at Mombasa affirmed the magistrate's
decision on appeal, asserting that Kenyan courts had jurisdiction
under the penal code, establishing a basis that allowed for the
conviction of fifty pirates in 2009 and 20 10.356
The High Court further suggested that Kenya could directly
apply the provisions of UNCLOS as international customary law
and punish piracy as a crime with no implementing statute:
Even if the Penal Code had been silent on the offence of piracy,
I am of the view that the Learned Principal Magistrate would
have been guided by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea which defines piracy in Articles 101 as consisting of
any of the following acts: - (a) any illegal acts of violence or
detention ... the Learned Principal Magistrate was bound to
apply the provisions of the Convention should there have been
deficiencies in our Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. I
would go further and hold that even if the Convention had not
been ratified and domesticated, the Learned Principal Magistrate
was bound to apply international norms and Instruments since
Kenya is a member of the civilized world and is not expected to
act in contradiction to expectations of member states of the
United Nations. 357
Professor James Gathii, a Kenyan scholar, finds this dictum to
352 Section 69 of the Kenyan Penal Code, which punished piracy jure gentium, both
in territorial waters and the high seas, was not in accordance with international law. See
Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note 69, at 422-23 (describing arguments made during the
proceedings).
353 See id.
354 Id at 423 & n.51 (citing Republic v. Hassan Mohamud Ahmed, (2008) L.R.K.
Crim. No. 434 of 2006 (High Court at Mombasa) (Kenya)).
355 Hassan M. Ahmed v. Republic, [2009] eKLR (Kenya), available at
http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/viewpreviewl.php?link=29235452362227475206351.
356 Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, 1j 50 &
n.33.
357 Republic v. Hassan Mohamud Ahmed, (2008) L.R.K. Crim. No. 434, at 4
(Kenya).
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be contrary to Kenyan treaty practice, which generally requires an
implementing law, and contrary to more general state practice on
universal jurisdiction and piracy in particular."' Gathii notes that
the history of Kenya's code further suggests that the original
provision punishing piracy by the law of nations was not intended
to allow for universal jurisdiction over piracy.359
On September 1, 2009, the older criminal law of piracy was
repealed, and the Merchant Shipping Act was amended to fully
implement the UNCLOS provisions on piracy and the SUA
Protocol on armed robbery of ships.3 60 The repeal and re-
enactment caused uncertainty as to whether pending proceedings
under old law must be dropped; the magistrate's courts ignored
this problem, and assumed proceedings could continue.3 6 ' Thus, in
2009 and 2010 about fifty pirates were sentenced under the older
piracy law of the Kenyan Penal Code, which criminalized piracyjure gentium. 362
358 Gathii, Jurisdiction, supra note 346, at 378-80; Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note
69, at 424-26 (addressing prior Kenyan decisions applying ratified but undomesticated
treaties, and noting that Kenya has generally been dualist).
359 Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note 69, at 426-28 (surveying the history of the
Kenyan code and arguing that by specifically including "territorial waters" it does not
support an intent to allow universal jurisdiction over piracy).
360 See Merchant Shipping Act, (2009) Cap. 389 §§ 369-70 (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Acts/TheMerchantShippingAct 2009.pdf.
361 See Paul Musili Wambua, The Legal Framework for Adjudication of Piracy
Cases in Kenya: Review of the Jurisdiction and Procedural Challenges and the
Institutional Capacity, in ANNA PETRIG, SEA PIRACY LAW 17-18 (Max Planck Institute
ed., 2010).
362 See Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note 69, at 430 ("[T]he current piracy
prosecutions are all being conducted under the repealed piracy provisions of the Penal
Code, rather than the new Merchant Shipping Act."); Legal Issues Related to Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, 50 (noting prosecutions in 2009 and 2010). for the
text of the judgments, see Maritime Piracy: Court Decisions and Other Matters, UNITED
NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
http://www.unicri.it/maritimepiracy/db.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). The database is
incomplete, but several cases concluded after the repeal of Section 69 (piracy jure
gentium) were proceedings charged under the prior law. See Republic v. Aid Mohamed
Ahmed & Seven Others, (2010) CR 3486/2008 (C. Magis. Ct., Mombasa) (Kenya)
(convicting and sentencing accused on Mar. 10, 2010); Republic v. Liban Ahmed Ali &
Ten Others, (2010) CR 1374/2009 (C. Magis. Ct., Mombasa) (Kenya) (convicting
accused and sentencing on Sept. 29, 2010); Republic v. Jama Abdikadir Farah & Six
Others, (2009) CR.1695/2009 (C. Magis. Ct., Mombasa) (Kenya) (convicting and
sentencing on Oct. 22, 2010); Republic v. Abdirashid Jama Gas & Sixteen others, (2010)
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In September 2010, nine accused pirates, charged under the
old law, brought a new appeal on jurisdiction.36 3 In Matter of M
Mohamed Hashi, the High Court of Mombasa held that under the
older law, Kenyan lower criminal courts do not have jurisdiction
over pirates captured outside of territorial waters.364 The court
noted that the general part of the Penal Code in Section 5 gives
Kenyan criminal courts territorial jurisdiction only, but Section 69,
which punishes piracy by the law of nations, includes the "high
seas." 365  The High Court held that the general part took
precedence over a specific provision "until Parliament corrects its
clear error," and jurisdiction was only proper for piracy in
territorial waters.36 6 The court further noted that the Merchant
Shipping Act crime of piracy could not stand in place of the
original crime charged since piracy under UNCLOS has a
different scope than piracy jure gentium and applying the law
retroactively would be ex post facto law. 367  The court therefore
held that the proceedings were void ab initio; the defect in
jurisdiction could not be remedied by amending the charge, and
the nine accused pirates were released.368
The Hashi decision was clearly relevant to proceedings begun
under the older law, but it did not directly address the question of
universal jurisdiction for lower criminal courts under the new
law.369 Since the new law was clearly designed to implement
CA 3472/2010 (acquitting all accused for lack of sufficient proof on Nov. 5, 2010).
363 In re Mohamud M. Hashi & Eight Others, (2010) L.K.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya),
available at kenyalaw.org/Downloads FreeCases/78571.pdf. The name of defendant is
cited interchangeably as Hashi, Dhodi and Dashi; Hashi will be used in this article.
364 Id at *24-26.
365 See Kenya Penal Code, Cap. 63 § 5 ("The jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya for
the purposes of this code extends to every place within Kenya, including territorial
waters."). See also Andrew Mwangura, The Legal Challenges of Prosecuting Pirates:
The Case of Kenya, SOMALIA REPORT, Feb. 26, 2011,
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/131/The-Legal-Challenges-ofProsecuti
ngPirates_ (explaining the legal effect of Kenya's change in law in piracy convictions).
366 In re Hashi, L.K.R. (Kenya), at *26-27. The Court further conducted an analysis
of other jurisdictional grants in Kenyan law, based primarily on Wambua, supra note
361, concluding that under the old law it was arguable that jurisdiction should be
confined to the High Court as part of admiralty jurisdiction. In re Hashi, at *33-34.
367 In re Hashi, at *37-44 (citing Wambua, supra note 361, at 17-18).
368 Id. at *17-18.
369 See Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 2, 50
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UNCLOS and Kenya's obligations under the Djibouti Code of
Conduct, there was a strong argument that the new law created
universal jurisdiction in the criminal courts of first instance.37 0
However, the arguments articulated in Hashi could potentially
limit jurisdiction to admiralty proceedings in the High Court
only.3 71 In May 2011, another judge of the High Court held that the
"manifest and functional position" was clearly that there was
jurisdiction in Kenya's criminal courts, and any denial of that
position was "essentially abstract."3 72
The issue was finally resolved by a decision of the Kenyan
Court of Appeal in Nairobi, which held that the new law simply
reestablished piracy jure gentium, which has now effectively
become UNCLOS Article 101.37 The Court further held that the
crime of piracy was not subject to the general territorial limitations
in Section 5 of the Kenyan Penal Code, as piracy belonged to a
different class of international crimes for which universal
jurisdiction was proper.374
Kenyan proceedings were also originally hindered by strict
rules requiring all non-documentary evidence to be proven by oral
evidence, and photographic evidence to be tendered by an officer
of the Attorney General who produced the photograph.3 75 More
recently, problems of presentation of evidence have been resolved
through use of video link testimony.376
& n.33.
370 Id. (describing how the "subordinate court," a court of first instance in Kenya,
exercised universal jurisdiction).
371 See Gathii, Jurisdiction, supra note 346, at 370, 390-91.
372 See Republic v. Abdirahman Isse Mohamud & Three Others, Misc. Crim. App.
72 of 2011 at *20 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), available at
http://www.unicri.it/maritimepiracy/docs/Kenya_201 _CrimNo 72%20(201l)%20Ru
ling%20on%20jurisdiction.pdf.
373 In re Mohamud Dashi & 8 Others, (2012) (C.A.K.) at *38-40 (Kenya),
available at http://piracylaw.files.wordpress.com/2012/1 0/kenya-hashi-appeal-
opinion.pdf.
374 Id. at *49-50 (resolving the question raised at *41-42).
375 See Gathii, Prosecutions, supra note 69, at 431 (noting delays in trials because
of non-attendance of witnesses); Mwangura, supra note 401; Bahar, supra note 107, at
60 (noting problems relating to Kenyan laws of evidence).
376 See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities
for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, J 34-37, U.N. Doc.
S/2011/360 (Jun. 15, 2011) (noting that many problems of procedure and evidence have
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The debate over jurisdiction in Kenya was influenced by
policy considerations as well, in particular the sense that Kenya's
original memoranda of understanding were "lopsided and
burdensome" and that Kenya would not become "an open door for
dumping pirates."" In March 2010, Kenya announced it would
not accept any more pirates and gave a six-month termination
notice on all its transfer agreements, claiming that nations had not
met obligations of helping with funding and assistance and that its
justice system was overburdened and overcrowded.37 8 In April
2010, Kenya totally refused to accept jurisdiction over pirates for a
few weeks. In May 2010, it reassumed receiving and adjudicating
pirates on an ad hoc basis.3 79
4. Seychelles Piracy Prosecutions
The most complete record of first-instance regional court
decisions on piracy convictions is from the Supreme Court of
Seychelles.3 80 These cases have been notable for several key
features:
(a) Consistent universal jurisdiction over pirates;3 81
(b) Consistent liability for attempted piracy;3 8 2
(c) Consistent use of the common enterprise doctrine
(Section 23 of the Seychelles Penal Code) to solve
problems of identification and accomplice liability;3 83
(d) The development of case law relating to circumstantial
been resolved through guidance from UNODC, including use of video witness
evidence).
377 See Wambua, supra note 361, at 37 (summarizing MOUs); id. at 21 & n.86
(citing statement of Minister for Foreign Affairs).
378 See Kenya Ends Trials of Somali Pirates in its Courts, BBC (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8599347.stm.
379 See Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge for Foreign Navies
that Catch Somali Pirates, WASHINGTON POST (May 24, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052303893.html.
380 See Cameron McLeod, Piracy Prosecutions in the Seychelles, GROATIAN




383 See Republic v. Mohamed Aweys Sayid et al. ("Galate"), Judgment, Crim. Side
No. 19 of 2010 (Dec. 15, 2010) (Seychelles).
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evidence and "piracy action groups";384
(e) Severity of the sentences; 38 5 and
(f) Most recently, a willingness to prosecute for cruising
without violence, as a participation in the "operation of
a pirate ship."3 86
Many of the current prosecutions of pirates in the Seychelles have
been for cases of attempted piracy, and intent has been established
by the surrounding circumstances, as well as the equipment
present and the location of the ship.3 " Two of the most recent
cases have involved prosecutions for operation of a pirate ship.3 88
a. Universal Jurisdiction over Piracy in Seychelles
In Seychelles, universal jurisdiction over piracy on the high
seas is not disputed, and the Supreme Court of Seychelles
addresses the issue relatively quickly. In Republic vs. Mohamed
Ahmed Dahir & Ten Others ("Topaz"),389 the court simply notes:
"such universal jurisdiction is provided for in international law."3 90
Republic v. Abdi Ali et al. ("Intertuna H"),391 examines the
question more carefully, relying on the Privy Council's rationale
of In re Piracy Jure Gentium 39 2 that "a person guilty of [the crime
of] piracy has placed himself beyond the protection of any
State." 39 3
384 See Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Ise & Four Others ("Talenduic"), Judgment,
Crim. Side No. 75 of 2010 (June 30, 2011) (Seychelles).
385 See McLeod, supra note 380.
386 See Jama, Judgment, TT 38-47, 56-57, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012)
(Seychelles) (on file with author) (convicting seven accused for "operation of a pirate
ship" without an attack).
387 See McLeod, supra note 380.
388 Id
389 Topaz, Judgment, 51, Crim. Side No. 51 of 2009 (July 26, 2010) (Seychelles).
390 Id. Additional charges of terrorism rely on other forms of jurisdiction, but these
are ultimately dismissed for lack of terrorist intent. Id. TT 36, 42-43. Since the Topaz
was a Seychellois vessel, arguably there was no need for universal jurisdiction in this
case.
391 Republic v. Abdi Ali et al. ("Intertuna I1"), Judgment, Crim. Side No. 14 of
2010 (Nov. 3, 2010) (Seychelles).
392 In re Piracy Jure Gentium, (1934) A.C. 586 (U.K.).
393 Id. at T 9.
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In Republic v. Mohamed Aweys Sayid et al. ("Galate'),34 the
court establishes universal jurisdiction by relying on UNCLOS,
which has now been adopted as the amendments to Section 65 of
the Penal Code, noting as well that the individual crime of piracy
is a breach of jus cogens-"a conventional peremptory norm that
states must uphold."39 5 This formulation appears again in Republic
vs. Mohamed Ahmed Ise & Four Others ("Talenduic"):
This universal jurisdiction makes it possible for the arresting
State, like the Republic of Seychelles in this case, to freely
prosecute suspected pirates, from anywhere in the world, and
punish them if found guilty under the municipal law, since the
crime of piracy jure gentium is considered to be a contravention
of jus cogens (compelling law), a conventional peremptory
international norm that States must uphold.396
The court notes that the issue is not in dispute, further relying
on Grotius's Piracy Jure Gentium, Halsbury's Laws of England,
Republic v. Houssein Mohammed Osman & Ten Others
("Draco"),3 97 and on the Lotus case of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
The court does not differentiate between universal jurisdiction
as a broad common interest of states and individual criminal
responsibility for heinous crimes. Instead, it equates individual
criminal responsibility with the duty of states: the "crime ofpiracy
is a breach jus cogens," which implies individual criminal liability
similar to war crimes.3 98 In doing so, the court follows the position
394 Galate, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of2010 (Dec. 15, 2010) (Seychelles).
395 Id. 37.
396 See Talenduic, Judgment, 22, Crim. Side No. 75 of 2010 (June 30, 2011)
(Seychelles).
397 Republic v. Osman & Ten Others ("Draco"), Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of
2011 (Oct. 12, 2011) (Seychelles), available at
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib/ilibl11028_R_v_Housseindocument.pdf.
398 The debate over whether piracy is a jus cogens crime is mentioned above in
supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. See also Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra
note 45, at 205 & n. 129 (noting development of jus cogens rationale in international
law). Strictly speaking, it is not the crime which is a breach of jus cogens; rather, jus
cogens implies a duty upon states to punish the crime, and an invalidation of any
contrary law. The end of the sentence, "that states must uphold," is more accurate. See,
e.g., Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and
International Humanitarian Law, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
at *14-15, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf
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of the UNODC that UNCLOS defines an international criminal
norm and that the customary law of piracy is similar to human
rights offenses.3 "9 This analysis also solves the legality problem in
absolute universal jurisdiction over pirates and paves the way for a
broader application of piracy.4 00
The reasoned decisions of the Supreme Court of Seychelles are
also creating precedent: when the court asserts universal
jurisdiction over piracy to the limits of the UNCLOS definition, it
establishes state practice that UNCLOS in fact embodies a
criminal norm of piracy.40 1 The current Seychelles definition of
piracy in Section 65(4) of the penal code uses nearly the same
wording as UNCLOS.4 02 What remains unclear is whether the
court itself perceives any limits on its jurisdiction that could come
from UNCLOS itself or customary law, such as extending Article
101(b) to a separate crime of cruising for piracy. In Gloria, for
example, the court discusses the defense arguments of absence of
"private ends" and "two ships" in the context of proving "the
essential ingredient[s] of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt
[which] must automatically lead to acquittal."4 03 It is not an issue
of jurisdiction.
The next section shows how almost all the Seychelles cases
involve some form of attempt. Arguably, if UNCLOS is now the
customary law crime of piracy, and it does not specifically
(describing jus cogens norm of suppressing piracy and slavery). Jus cogens in the
context of grave crimes, such as human rights violations is a relatively new concept
however, and the duty to suppress piracy, if such a peremptory norm exists, is more
likely the common obligation of states to cooperate in the suppression of piracy. Id., at
*16, & n.119. The Court, however, sees no need to distinguish between various
interpretations of universal jurisdiction here. Draco, Judgment, 32 (describing the
principal of universal jurisdiction as applying to hostis humani generis crimes).
399 COUNTER-PIRACY PROGRAMME: IMO CAPACITY-BUILDING CONFERENCE TO
COUNTER PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, May 15, 2012,
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/UNODC.pdf (stating
that UNCLOS "[e]stablishes the legal framework for combating piracy).
400 See Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction, 2 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 735 (2004).
401 Compare Draco, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2011, with Jama, Judgment,
Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012) (Seychelles) (on file with author).
402 Compare Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 2010, § 65(4) (Seychelles) (amending
Penal Code 1955, CAP. 73 (Seychelles)), with UNCLOS, supra note 16.
403 Republic v. Ahmed ("Gloria"), Judgment, 19-21, Crim. Side No. 21 of 2011
(July 14, 2011) (Seychelles).
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criminalize attempt, universal jurisdiction would not apply.
Violent attempts might still fall under 101(a) "acts of violence or
detention," but nonviolent attempts may only be crimes under the
national code.404 If the international crime is no longer being
charged, the court might lose its universal jurisdiction.40 5  In
Draco, however, the court concluded there was no basis for a
charge of piracy jure gentium, and yet the facts were sufficient for
an attempt conviction under the Seychelles Penal Code. 40 6 This
suggests that the court is continuing to assert universal jurisdiction
to an entirely domestic definition of attempted piracy-possibly a
form of pendent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the court could
be interpreting UNCLOS to include all modes of liability where
the intent is ultimately violent piracy.
b. Attempt Liability in the Seychelles Cases
The Seychelles cases all involve some form of attempted
piracy, although only three directly refer to convictions for
attempt. One such case is Topaz, in which an aircraft alerted a
Seychelles Coast Guard (SCG) patrol vessel of the presence of two
skiffs and a whaler, commonly used as a "mother ship."40 7 The
Topaz chased after the skiffs and came under fire, managing to
subdue the skiffs and apprehend three additional men on the
whaler.4 08  The eight men on the skiffs were convicted for "a
frustrated attempt to commit piratical robbery which, according to
the cited authorities and the definition, constitutes the offence of
piracy jure gentium," and the three on the whaler were convicted
for aiding and abetting piracy. 409 The court, noting that robbery is
not an essential element of the crime of piracy, convicted the eight
accused on the skiffs on the basis of assault-causing fear of
imminent death or harm in the crew of the Topaz-and a frustrated
attempt at robbery.410
404 See, e.g., Draco, Judgment.
405 See supra notes 42-43, 167 and accompanying text.
406 Draco, Judgment, 24 (concluding there is no basis for piracy charge); id. 30
(concluding there is a basis for attempted piracy under § 65(3)).
407 Topaz, Judgment, 3-7, Crim. Side No. 51 of 2009 (July 26, 2010)
(Seychelles).
408 Id. 11-13.
409 Id. 1161-62, 66-71.
410 Id. 55-59.
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The common intention of the accused to execute a "pre-
arranged plan" was vital to establishing they were all equally
guilty.41  The court found there was a common intention based on
the method of the attack, the actions of the accused, the types of
weapons used, the locations of the boats, and the gadgets found on
board.4 12 Predicated on this finding, the court concluded that the
accused were engaged in acts of piracy.413 As for the three aiders
and abettors on the mother ship, the court found they were also
involved in the "preparatory stages," 414 based on the kind of
equipment on board the ship and its location, as well as pre-trial
statements from the accused that it was an "umbilical cord."4 15 All
indications pointed to the fact that the three were intentionally
aiding the pirates.4 16
In Intertuna II, another attempted piracy jure gentium, two
skiffs approached the Intertuna Dos at great speed and with AK-
47s and ladders on board.4 17 Although the first shots were fired by
security guards, the method of the attack and the equipment were
sufficient to establish an attempted seizure of the ship or of
assault.4 18 The additional crew on board the whaler were charged
with a common intention to participate in the attempt.4 19
Galate was the first case under the new law codifying the
UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.420 The pirates were
charged with three counts of piracy for three different ships - the
Galate, a Seychellois fishing vessel; the Al-Ahmadi, an Iranian
vessel later captured for fuel; and the Topaz, a coast guard vessel
that arrived on the scene to rescue the crew.421  The Somalis
411 Id. 29-33, 60.
412 Id. 33.








420 This definition was adopted in March 2010. See Penal Code (Amendment) Bill,
2010, § 65(3) (Seychelles) (amending Penal Code 1955, CAP. 73 (Seychelles)).
421 Galate, Judgment, T 2-4, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2010 (Dec. 15, 2010)
(Seychelles).
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argued in their defense, as they had in earlier cases, that they were
fishermen who had been drifting for three days and were merely
seeking help to get back to Somalia.42 2 However, no fishing
equipment was found on their vessel. 423 "On the other hand, they
had two ladders suitable for climbing onto bigger ships, outboard
engines and firearms, leav[ing] no doubt that the real intention ...
was not to catch fish but to reach and board other vessels with the
use of force as necessary."4 24
As to the Topaz (the SCG vessel), which arrived last to the
scene, the defense argued there was no act of piracy;425 any shots
fired by the pirates were only fired after the Coast Guard opened
fire, were fired in self-defense, and, in any case, were unsuccessful
and out of range. 426 The court rejected these arguments, finding
that self-defense was irrelevant when engaged in criminal activity,
that at least two of the accused had fired, and that it did not matter
whether any of the shots had actually reached the Topaz, because
"a successful act of violence is not a prerequisite proof that the
offence as charged has been committed." 421 Only two pirates fired
at the Topaz,4 28 but nonetheless all accused were convicted of
piracy based on their "common intention to prosecute an unlawful
purpose." 42 9
In Galate, although the court never used the term "attempt" to
qualify the actions of the pirates, the facts of the third count,
detailing the assault against the Topaz (the same ship as the earlier
case), match the assault in the Topaz in which the court did find
there was attempted piracy jure gentium.4 30 It thus appears that
under the new law, the court does not distinguish between
attempted piracy and perpetration, focusing instead on the all-
422 Id. 27.




427 Galate, Judgment, 47.
428 Id. 15.
429 Id. 48; see McLeod, supra note 380 (noting that the Court convicted all
"regardless of their lack of success").
430 Compare Galate, Judgment, 12, with Topaz, Judgment, TT 11-12, Crim. Side
No. 51 of 2009, (July 26, 2010) (Seychelles).
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inclusive "violence" and equating the attempted violence against
the Topaz with the seizure of the two other ships under the
UNCLOS definition, echoing the distinction between U.S. and
Dutch law on this point.4 31
In Talenduic, the court further developed the interpretation of
"acts of violence" as including unsuccessful attacks.432 Here, the
court found no difficulty convicting the perpetrators of attacks on
two vessels even though "no one was injured and no vessel was
damaged in the attempt" because (as quoted in the Topaz) "a
frustrated attempt [to commit] a piratical robbery will constitute
piracy jure gentium."433 This holding emphasizes the court's
understanding that the UNCLOS definition, in its breadth, is
supported by the underlying customary law definition.434  The
conviction was also the first in the Seychelles for "operation of a
pirate ship" under the second part of the UNCLOS definition.
Republic vs. Abdukar Ahmed & Five Others ("Gloria") again
involved the assault of three ships-one which was captured and
the crew held hostage for several hours, and two from the SCG
that participated in a rescue and were attacked but not harmed.4 36
The pirates were convicted of three counts of piracy for all three
ships, and all six were held equally responsible based on a
common intention to attack,437 with no essential distinction
between the successful attack and the two unsuccessful ones.438
There was a distinction in sentencing, however, with twenty-four
years for the original ship seized, and eighteen years each for the
coast guard ships, to run concurrently. 439 All equipment on board
431 Galate, Judgment, 47 ("Furthermore a successful act of violence is not a
prerequisite proof that the offence as charged has been committed.").
432 Talenduic, Judgment, 1 39, Crim. Side No. 75 of 2010 (June 30, 2011)
(Seychelles).
433 Id
434 The Kenyan High Court of Mombasa adopted a different approach, which was
only recently rejected by the Court of Appeal of Nairobi. See supra notes 304-309 &
366-374, and accompanying text.
435 Talenduic, Judgment, 40.
436 Gloria, Judgment, $t 1, 5-10, Crim. Side No. 21 of 2011 (July 14, 2011)
(Seychelles).
437 Id. 1 18.
438 Id. TT 25-26.
439 Gloria, Sentence, T 6. A similar distinction was made in the Galate case, with a
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was also seized pursuant to Section 65(7) of the penal code, which
is worded nearly exactly the same as UNCLOS Article 105.440
Perhaps the most fascinating instance of a case distinguishing
an attempt from a frustrated attack is Draco,44 1 in which the pirates
were thwarted in their attack before managing to fire any shots.4 42
The security guard of the Draco fired 171 rounds into the air and
water, successfully repulsing the pirate skiff for three or four hours
before a European Union Naval Force helicopter arrived on the
scene.4 43 The helicopter found two pirate skiffs and a whaler, and
continued hovering overhead for about eight hours, photographing
the scene and firing warning shots, until it was finally joined by its
dispatching warship, the Canarias.44 4 By the time the pirates were
apprehended, they had discarded all weapons.445 Based on these
facts, the court did not convict for piracy because there had been
no act of "violence, depredation or detention;" 446 nonetheless, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence of intent to qualify as
attempt under the penal code." The pirates were also convicted
of operating the ship.448 The sentence was ten years for the
operation of the ship and six years for the attempt, the two terms to
run concurrently.44 9
In sum, the Seychelles cases address two types of attempt.
The first is attempted piracy jure gentium, or any act of violence
or depredation, regardless of success. The second type is
attempted piracy under the Seychelles Penal Code, which is
engaging in overt acts with the intent to commit piracy, even
though there is not yet any violence.4 50 This latter form of attempt
sentence of eleven years for the successful attacks and ten years for the coast guard
attempted attack. See id. T 8.
440 See id. 2.
441 Draco, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2011 (Oct. 12, 2011) (Seychelles),
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib/ilib 111028_R-vHousseindocument.pdf.
442 Id. T 4-6.
443 Id 7.
444 Id. 8-10.
445 Id. Tfl0- 11.
446 Id 23-24.
447 Draco, Judgment, 28.
448 Id 31.
449 Id 8.
450 Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 2010, § 65(3) (Seychelles) (amending Penal
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is also punishable, although the sentence is less than for the
former. 451 The court appears to exercise universal jurisdiction over
attempted piracy as defined by Sections 65(3) and 377 of the
Seychelles Penal Code, which have no parallel in UNCLOS.4 52
c. Common Intention and Piracy Action Groups
In Talenduic, the court was faced with the problem of
identifying the accused: none of the individuals who were arrested
could be positively identified by any of the witnesses.453
Nevertheless, the court convicted the entire group based on
circumstantial evidence connecting it to the attack.454 To support
this decision, the court employed a new innovative terminology:
because there was a "Piracy Action Group" ("PAG") identified by
witnesses and associated with an attack, there was sufficient
evidence to convict each of the PAG's members, even though no
individual pirates could be identified.45 5 The court relied on the
location and position of the PAG, the time since the attack, the
lack of other PAGs in the vicinity, and the lack of hiding places, to
conclude that the PAG as a whole was the same.4 56 The accused
were convicted of a common intention or plan, since it was not
clear how many had actually participated in the attack.4 57
The Talenduic case is not unique in using the common
intention or plan. All charges of piracy in these cases are read in
concert with Section 23 of the Penal Code, making every
participant equally liable regardless of individual acts.458
Although almost all the cases use this evidence to prove common
Code 1955, CAP. 73 (Seychelles)).
451 See, e.g., Jama, Judgment, 1 28, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012)
(Seychelles) (on file with author) (citing the Seychelles Penal Code).
452 Compare Draco, Judgment, 30, with UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 100-107.
453 Talenduic, Judgment, 31, Crim. Side No. 75 of 2010 (June 30, 2011)
(Seychelles) ("The bedrock of the defence case is that none of the witnesses could
identify any of the accused persons in and or out of court nor place them at the scene.").
454 See id. 37; Talenduic, Sentence, 8.
455 Talenduic, Judgment, 8, 28.
456 Id. T 32.
457 Id. 1 37.
458 See Topaz, Judgment, 48, Crim. Side No. 51 of 2009, (July 26, 2010)
(Seychelles); Draco, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2011 (Oct. 12, 2011) (Seychelles);
Gloria, Judgment, 1, Crim. Side No. 21 of 2011 (July 14, 2011) (Seychelles).
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intent, Talenduic is unique because it uses PAG evidence to
identify individual members of the group.4 59
Talenduic and Draco, the two cases in which there are
convictions for operation of a pirate ship, are instructive on the use
of this circumstantial PAG evidence. Talenduic involved a vessel
that had been taken over and used for acts of violence and piracy
jure gentium; Draco did not.4 60 The UNCLOS provision and its
parallel in Seychellois law do not require that the ship actually be
used for piracy; rather, these provisions only require that those in
control intend for it to be used for such a purpose.4 6' Thus, the
Draco court inferred from circumstantial evidence of the attempt
and the violence on the surveillance helicopter that "[c]learly, the
accused were waiting to chance on other passing vessels and their
participation in the operation of the 'pirate ships' as well as the
whole venture was voluntary rather than involuntary, and for
private ends." 4 62 Thus, all the circumstantial evidence concerning
the use of the ship shows the intent of the crew, which in turn
defines the intent of the ship.
d. Convictions for "Operation of a Pirate Ship" with
No Evidence of Violent Attack
The most obvious cumulative precedent of the Seychelles
cases is the heavily fact-based identification and usage of the PAG
as a tool for circumstantial evidence. 4 63  Thus, perhaps almost
459 See, e.g., Draco, Judgment, 19, 291 (using PAG evidence to show common
intent).
460 Compare Draco, Judgment, T 11, with Talenduic, Judgment, 1 6.
461 UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 103; Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 2010, § 65(3)
(Seychelles) (amending Penal Code 1955, CAP. 73 (Seychelles)).
462 Draco, Judgment, 31.
463 Jama, Judgment, 52, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012) (Seychelles)
(on file with author)("Judicial notice is taken of what sailors and experts in this field
have stated regarding the composition or characteristics of a typical piracy action
group."). This development indicates the pragmatism of the court and closely parallels
the increasing efficiency of law enforcement in the region, which is using sophisticated
surveillance, photographic and video evidence, and databases of suspected vessels. See,
e.g., id. 10-18 (describing the use of radar, photography, and video by Royal Navy
and Norwegian Maritime Patrol Aircraft; the court carefully analyzed the video footage,
and in fact most of the equipment that served as the basis of PAG evidence in this case
was dumped prior to arrest and only observed on video). See Republic v. Dahir ("Happy
Bird'), Judgment, IT 22-25, Crim. Side No. 7 of 2012 (July 31, 2012) (Seychelles) (on
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inevitably, the court applied PAG evidence in two recent cases to
prove that a ship was a "pirate ship," even though there was no
attack, and to convict all on board for "operation of a pirate
ship."464
Although these cases progress one step closer to convicting on
intent alone where legally no attack has begun, they both involve
situations in which an arrest was initiated in response to a distress
signal for piratical activity. In Republic v. Mohamed Abi Jama &
Six Others ("Jama"), a PAG was spotted after an aborted attack on
a British warship, the Fort Victoria, and a preemptive distress call
from the Spanish fishing boat Alakrantxu.4 65 The same PAG was
spotted about an hour later with a whaler and one skiff.466 The
helicopter and a Norwegian Maritime Patrol Aircraft managed to
capture the crew of the PAG dumping ladders and other equipment
overboard.46 7  By the time the crew of the whaler and the skiff
were apprehended, no piratical equipment was found, except for a
single AK-47 bullet, but no fishing equipment was found either.468
In Republic v. Liban Mohamed Dahir & Twelve (12) Others
("Happy Bird'), a PAG was spotted, recorded, and photographed
before any attack; about twenty-two hours later, an attack was
launched on the Happy Bird.469 Almost a day after this attack, the
PAG from the first surveillance photos was arrested, but the
captain of the Happy Bird was unable to identify the ships or any
persons on board.4 70 Since there was no conclusive evidence
file with author) (comparing "testimony of persons having had contact with a PAG,"
citing prior cases, and listing identifying factors); id. 43 (convicting on the basis that
the accused in this case were members of a PAG).
464 See Jama, Judgment, IT 40-44 (noting several factors that comprise a PAG,
location, nature of ships and formation, nature of equipment and flight from law
enforcement, and carefully applying them to this case); id 54-57 (concluding after
lengthy deliberation on circumstantial evidence, the state of the law, and foreseeability,
that in this case the crew of the ships were a PAG, and therefore guilty of operation of a
pirate ship).
465 Jama, Sentence, 10.
466 Id. TT 10-14.
467 Id. TT 15-18 (describing dumping of ladders and other equipment).
468 Id. IT 24-25 (recounting that nothing of note was found aboard skiff, except one
7.62mm round not used by coalition forces).
469 Happy Bird, Judgment, 8-14, Crim. Side No. 7 of 2012 (July 31, 2012)
(Seychelles).
470 Id. % 15-17 (noting some circumstantial evidence based on location and
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linking the PAG to the attack, the piracy charge was dropped and
only the operation of a pirate ship charge remained.4 71 While the
evidence captured was pronounced insufficient to support a piracy
charge, the court found it was incompatible with any explanation
other than guilt for operation of a pirate ship.4 72
In Jama, the court was evidently conflicted, both in
establishing its own legal basis for conviction and in protecting the
rights of defendants.47 3 Ultimately, the court decided that the
presence of all the "necessary indicia" of a PAG excluded any
possibility other than guilt.47 4 Additionally, the court analogized
to the usage of equipment articles in the slave trade as support for
its conclusion that the status of a ship could be based on
circumstantial evidence alone. 475  According to the court, the
purpose of such articles was "to provide the court with some
measure of foreseeability."476 Though the court acknowledged
that no such equipment articles or possession offenses were
currently in place for piracy convictions,47 7 these articles
nonetheless provided the court with a strong theoretical basis for
conviction on intent alone. In the case of hooked ladders-which
had no lawful purpose-the court held that this argument was even
absence of other PAGs, connecting the Yemeni- 18 to the attack).
471 Id. 37-38.
472 Id. TT 19-25 (noting evidence found on board skiff: 11 AK-47 variant rifles, 2
pistols, 1 Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher, a significant amount of ammunition for
all 14 weapons, ammunition carrying belts, military body webbing, 1 pineapple grenade,
I anti-personnel grenade, 1 suspected Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 2 hooked
boarding ladders, a large amount of fuel, a life jacket taken from the Fairchem Boger, a
vessel known to have been captured by pirates in August 2011, 2 GPS units, an outboard
motor for a skiff, cell phones, food and other personal property which, in combination
with general characteristics of a PAG and lack of fishing equipment, was conclusive for
the Court); id $ 38-40, 43-44 (convicting).
473 Jama, Judgment, 1 48 (noting few results from research, and no explicit
legislation); id 49 (suggesting comparison to equipment articles and citing advisory
scholarly articles); id 50 (arguing for proper current interpretation of "operation of a
pirate ship").
474 Id. f 53-56 (excluding any inference other than guilt, and noting that crew "had
gone beyond mere preparation").
475 Id 49.
476 Id
477 Id 47-48 ("The Seychelles has not yet expressly or directly legislated for
such eventuality in piracy matters.").
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stronger.47 8 The court also carefully avoided the problem of
convicting for a crime that does not require intent.47 9
The court did not address the possibility that the unique
international status of piracy should not apply to inchoate offenses.
The question not raised, and which is still in need of resolution, is
whether the jurisdiction itself should be void in the case of
inchoate offenses, since prosecution is not foreseeable to
defendants themselves. The court skipped this question and
established a new principle designed to "eliminate loopholes in the
law."480 Significantly, universal jurisdiction is not addressed at all
in Jama; the court apparently believed this issue had been resolved
in earlier cases. A possible conclusion is that the court sees
jurisdiction as proper anywhere in the high seas, in all cases where
a potential piracy crime could be committed. The issue for the
court was only sufficiency of intent evidence within domestic
criminal law: since the PAG evidence is sufficient to prove intent
for criminal law purposes, it is sufficient to resolve universal
jurisdiction and attendant problems of international law as well.
Undoubtedly, since the Supreme Court of Seychelles is the
main hub of piracy trials,48 ' its judicial practice will also influence
enforcement practices, leading to the arrest of PAG formations
that are merely cruising. In effect, this will produce the same
result as if equipment articles had been enacted by treaty or
international agreement. Since UNCLOS has not previously been
applied in this way, and the actus reus and mens rea of the offense
are different from core piracy, the court is thus creating new
law.482
478 Id. 1 50.
479 Jama, Judgment, 56, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (Jul. 25, 2012) (Seychelles)
(on file with author); see supra note 186; infra note 484.
480 Jama, Judgment, 58.
481 McLeod, supra note 380.
482 Note that one problem with this development would relate to involuntary
induction of the accused into pirate crews. Currently the Seychelles Penal Code s. 23
places equal responsibility on all crew members, but this should not be sufficient to
overcome the fact that some crew members should not be subject to jurisdiction at all.
Both Jama and Happy Bird involved minors who were given lesser sentences. See
Jama, Sentence, 6 (sentencing minor over 14 but under 18 to serve two as opposed to
seven years); Happy Bird, Judgment, T 16, Crim. Side No. 7 of 2012 (July 31, 2012)
(Seychelles) (sentencing minors to two and a half years, as opposed to twelve years).
Happy Bird additionally involved a 12 year-old, who was conditionally released, id. 1
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e. The Abandonment Defense
If the PAG formation is sufficient for conviction, are there any
limits on its application? The court only addresses the cases
standing before it, but one reason the court may not have
addressed the jurisdictional international law question is that it
assumes jurisdiction is automatic for any PAG on the high seas.483
Thus, any PAG on the high seas is potentially exposed to
conviction. This jurisdictional issue could lead to over-conviction,
and raises the question of whether there should be any limits to
convictions based on a future status of the ship. It is quite possible
that a simple practical limitation on the liability of a PAG will be
the consideration of whether there was an imminent attack and
active distress calls, as suggested by the facts of the cases above.484
These and other practical factors such as specific locations or the
outfitting of skiffs may be implied judicial limits on what is
legally defined as a PAG. The court suggests that imminent attack
may be crucial and that some threshold was crossed.4 85
Another judicial option is an adoption of the "abandonment
defense," which could potentially allow for any PAG that has not
yet commenced an attack to voluntarily surrender itself to law
enforcement, perhaps register in a database, and leave
unprosecuted.4 86 The abandonment defense was explicitly
included in the comments of the Harvard Draft and was raised as
15, and an 11 year-old who was released immediately, id. 1 6. In assessing the severity
of the sentences, the court noted the severity of recruiting child soldiers, but another
aspect of the problem is that minors may legitimately claim they were not voluntary
participants. In this case, one of the adults testified on his own behalf that he was
forcibly drugged and induced to board the ship; this testimony did not fit the facts,
especially after the accused threatened to shoot the prosecutor. Compare Happy Bird,
Judgment, f 30-31, with Happy Bird, Sentence, 13. In a future case, perhaps such
testimony from minors would be more credible. See also Sonia Messaoudi, Child
Pirates: A Key Issue for Respecting Child's Rights and Halting Piracy, COMMUNIs
HosTIs OMNIUM, Oct. 23, 2012, http://piracy-law.com/2012/10/23/child-pirates-a-key-
issue-for-respecting-childs-rights-and-halting-piracy/.
483 See generally supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
484 See Jama, Judgment, T 56; see also Happy Bird, Judgment, 11.
485 See Jama, Judgment, 56; see also Happy Bird, Judgment, 11.
486 Note that in Happy Bird, for example, another known suspect ship the Liquid
Velvet was being escorted back to Somalia when the distress call was heard. See Happy
Bird, Judgment, T 15.
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a possibility by the International Law Commission.487 The
normative question is: should pirates who enter the high seas with
all equipment necessary for the commission of piracy be
encouraged to abandon such a purpose and give themselves in?
Or should remorse only be considered in mitigation? Some have
suggested that, by the logic of the court, all on board are guilty of
a completed offense the moment a PAG enters the high seas with
intent to commit piracy, and there is no option for abandonment
after that.488 If this assessment of the court's jurisprudence is
correct, the bright line rule should be re-examined in future years
to determine whether it is in fact the best deterrent for piracy.
487 See Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, supra note 69, at 823 ("If the pirate
ship has made no piratical attack, its piratical character will be dissipated by a definite
abandonment of piratical purposes."). The Harvard Draft thus emphasizes that "when it
is devoted" is the operative language in the text, and excludes ships whose piratical
purpose has been abandoned. This use of "when" is also the language that the ILC
adopted in the Draft Regime on the High Seas in 1955, art. 24, [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 25 ("[W]hen it is devoted by the persons in dominant control to the purpose of
committing an act. . ."). The ILC comments also suggest an adoption of the abandonment
defense because the right of seizure in Article 18 is extended to vessels which have
committed piracy but not those that intend piracy. Id. at 26. The Belgian government
suggested using a broader wording, to include all ships with an intended piratical use.
See [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 39. This language was ultimately adopted by the
Rapporteur, in a text that closely mirrors UNCLOS. Id. at 19. However, none of the
state parties discussed the abandonment defense; they were only concerned with
broadening the scope of "pirate ship" to include future intent. This leaves the question
open.
488 I am extremely grateful to Matthew Williams, law clerk to Judge Duncan
Gaswaga, Supreme Court of the Seychelles, for his correspondence with me on this
issue. In his personal assessment of Seychelles law and the practice of the court, once a
ship has entered the high seas with equipment (especially hooked ladders which are
suited only to one purpose) and circumstances indicating an intent to commit piracy, the
offense would be complete, and abandonment would be considered in mitigation, but not
accepted as an affirmative defense. He also noted that "any act of voluntary
participation" legally includes any act at all, suggesting the offense is complete at an
early point. Furthermore, Mr. Williams noted that abandonment is unlikely to be
considered "voluntary" when it occurs in the face of a warship; however some other
hypothetical scenarios of voluntary abandonment might be considered. E-mail from
Matthew Williams, Law Clerk to Judge Duncan Gaswaga, to author (July 24-26, 2012)
(on file with author).
5552013]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
5. Interim Conclusion: The Crime of "Operation of
Pirate Ship " Should not Be Prosecuted where there is
No Violent Attack
Although the research on piracy prosecutions is based only on
public sources, it shows several trends. First, of all the non-
regional states, only the Netherlands has exercised universal
jurisdiction over Somali pirates.489 Of regional states, Yemen has
accepted some transfers based on universal jurisdiction, though the
majority of transfers have been by Kenya and Seychelles.490 The
vast majority of prosecutions are in areas of Somalia and are still
under laws that do not reflect UNCLOS.4 9 ' If the work of the
UNODC continues as planned, there will be a number of regional
states with domestic crimes of piracy that implement UNCLOS
provisions and prosecute universal jurisdiction cases within
several years.
Seychelles, which has become a hub of piracy trials,4 92 has
shown that it will prosecute pirates who intend piracy, even
though they have not yet begun an attack.493 Similarly, the
Netherlands, also a center of piracy prosecutions, has laws that
- * 494criminalize service as master or crew of a pirate ship. However,
prosecutors rarely pursue cases involving only evidence of
491intent. Other states show little or no will to prosecute where
there is no victim ship.496 While one main reason for the
infrequency of this state practice may be the simple problem of
proving intent, it may also reflect the state of customary
489 Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 13th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/L/3415 (Oct. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction'].
490 See, e.g.. Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1134 (discussing how many
cases have been transferred to Kenya).
491 See id. at 1128.
492 McLeod, supra note 380.
493 Draco, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2011 (Oct. 12, 2011) (Seychelles),
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib/ilib11028_R v Houssein document.pdf.
494,- Interview with Henny Baan, Dutch Public Prosecutor to the Rotterdam District
Court, in the Peace Palace Library, Hague, Netherlands (Jan. 10, 2012).
495 Id.
496 See cf Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 47, at 229 (explaining that a
directly injured nation might have less incentive to prosecute when pirates commit
robbery as opposed to murder).
556 [Vol. XXXVIII1
EvOLVING DEFINITION OF PIRACY
international law and the states' accepted interpretation of
UNCLOS.49 7 This could suggest that the offense of UNCLOS
Article 101(b), "operation of a pirate ship," is currently not applied
to include universal jurisdiction over mere conspiracy and
preparatory acts as a punishable crime. Moreover, the current
practice of catch-and-release is especially common with regard to
pirates for whom there is no evidence of participation in an attack
or violent act.498 This practice may be evidence of a custom of
non-prosecution where pirates are apprehended simply due to
operating a ship and planning for piracy. 49
If regional states were to start enacting equipment articles,
defendants could argue against the practice based on lack of
foreseeability of prosecution or on accessibility of these laws, both
of these defenses raise the ultimate issue concerning problems of
legality in universal jurisdiction prosecutions of piracy.so The
prosecution of pirates for mere cruising, while potentially
supportable under UNCLOS, is not widely supported by state
practice."o' Since it falls on the fringes of the core definition of
piracy under UNCLOS, it is not sufficiently established as a
customary criminal law norm applicable to individuals. For these
reasons, a municipal prosecution on the basis of this provision
would be contrary to nullum crimen sine lege.
On the other hand, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
of Seychelles are the functional equivalent of enacting equipment
articles. They implicitly understand UNCLOS Article 101(b) as a
mode of liability and represent a developing practice to broaden
the modes of liability for the crime of piracy, echoed in current
497 Seychelles is in fact a pioneer in this regard, and is addressing issues for which
there is little precedent. E-mail from Judge Duncan Gaswaga, Seychelles Supreme Court,
to author (Mar. 27, 2011) (on file with author).
498 See Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, 13 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm ("The dominant approach has been to avoid
capturing pirates in the first place, or, if captured, releasing the pirates without charging
them with a crime.") [hereinafter Kontorovich, International Legal Responses].
499 See Jarret Berg, Note, "You're Gonna Need a Bigger Boat": Somali Piracy and
the Erosion of Customary Piracy Suppression, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 378 (2010)
(noting how failure to prosecute in catch-and-release cases may create custom).
500 See, e.g., Kontorovich, Equipment Articles, supra note 6, at 1-2.
501 See Kontorovich, International Legal Responses, supra note 498.
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precedent in the Netherlands and the United States on attempted
piracy, as well as in some of the other state cases mentioned
above. The potential consequences are far-reaching and could
lead to a spate of convictions to clear the seas of pirates before
they have committed piracy.
VI. Conclusions
Universal prosecutions of piracy are, in many ways, a modem
development. Since 2006, the number of universal jurisdiction
cases in regionally affected states in East Africa has at least
doubled the number of universal jurisdiction cases in the 300 years
before then.50 2  Universal jurisdiction is currently exercised
primarily by regionally affected states, and the U.N. bodies
dealing with the crime of piracy are agencies that deal with other
transnational crimes such as drugs and money-laundering, not
state-sponsored human rights offenses."o3 If piracy is in fact quite
different from human rights offenses, this development would
signal a new regime that is better equipped to deal with
transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and money
laundering in a wider jurisdictional interpretation of the
"protective principle" for offenses that require broad cooperation
and for which there is a broad common interest in prosecution but
traditional bases of jurisdiction do not provide a sufficient nexus
for any one state. Historically, this is perhaps the best role for
universal jurisdiction.
The strengths of universal jurisdiction over piracy are, in some
ways, also its weaknesses. Since pirates are not within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state and prosecution does little to
interfere with sovereignty, pirates are also not on notice of any
state's law.504 Since piracy is not a state-sponsored crime, it is
importune to demand that pirates know treaty law, and it is also
just to interpret existing international legal instruments in their
favor as laymen.
These aspects of piracy may create issues of legality where
pirates are prosecuted for crimes that fall under the wider
definition of piracy under UNCLOS but are not established in state
502 Id.
503 See Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction', supra note 489.
504 See, e.g., Kontorovich, Equipment Articles, supra note 6, at 1-2.
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practice, such as "operation of a pirate ship." Lower-level pirates,
as opposed to kingpins, may also be inducted into crews
involuntarily or not intend violent piracy. This is especially true
of minors. By default, even without any international treaty or
agreement, regional states are building a prosecution regime
similar to equipment articles and establishing that states such as
the Seychelles are resolved to prosecute in cases of simply
cruising in "pirate ships," without any violence yet committed,
according to the broader reading of UNCLOS. 0 s Such a
development is not only an evidentiary presumption under local
statutes, but can become, in effect, a gradual change in the
customary international law of piracy.
505 See, e.g., Jama, Judgment, 52, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 (July 25, 2012)
(Seychelles); Happy Bird, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 7 of 2012 (July 31, 2012)
(Seychelles) (punishing for the offense of "operation of a pirate ship.").
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Table 1: National Piracy Laws and their Incorporation of
Universal Jurisdiction5 06
Law of Nations (some with United States, New Zealand, Canada, Singapore,
UJ) Malaysia, Israel, Bahamas
Incorporating Treaty Bulgaria, Poland, Finland, Oman, Czech Republic, Iran,
Commitments Latvia, China, France508
(with UJ)
5 0 7
UNCLOS South Africa, Malta, United Kingdom, Kenya, Tanzania,
(mostly with UJ) Cyprus, Liberia, Mauritius Australia, Belgium,509510 ' 11
Seychelles, Somaliland
Defining Piracy without Thailand, Japan,'ls Greece, Estonia, Ukraine, Germany,
UNCLOS, but UJ 512  514 Netherlands, Italy, Suriname515
Defining Piracy without Sri Lanka, Denmark, Turkey, South Korea, Georgia,
UJ 516 Russia, Albania, Argentina,517 Philippines, 518 Ecuador
Other State Offenses 519  Austria, Norway, Brazil, United Arab Emirates,
520Azerbaijan, Yemen , India, 521 Cuba, Jamaica
No Category522 Grenada, Zambia
506 See Dutton, Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1141 (citing National Legislation
on Piracy, U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA (last updated Oct.
26, 2011), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/piracynational legislation.htm
[hereinafter National Legislation]). Footnotes have been added to address a number of
states not included in Professor Dutton's survey sample or whose law may have changed
since the above table was prepared.
507 These states would only prosecute piracy based on the direct application of an
international criminal norm-either a treaty obligation (if UNCLOS creates a criminal
norm) or the customary crime of piracy-which might be narrower than the UNCLOS
definition (for example excluding universal jurisdiction over acts in 101(b) and 101 (c),
and possibly even attempt according to U.S. precedent). Bulgaria, Finland, Czech
Republic, Latvia, and China would likely only prosecute pursuant to a treaty obligation,
i.e., if it were determined that UNCLOS defines a crime. The Bulgarian Penal Code has
no specific provisions on piracy, but suggests that it would apply the definition in
UNCLOS Article 101 as a criminal offense based on the treaty. Letter from the
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bulg. to the U.N. to the Division for Ocean
Affairs & the Law of the Sea (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/BGR penal
code.pdf. Finland likewise has no specific provisions on piracy, but would prosecute an
international offense "based on an international agreement binding on Finland," although
it is less clear if that offense would be considered to be an act defined in UNCLOS
Article 101. Letter from Permanent Mission of Finland to the U.N. to the Division for
Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea (Feb. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/FIN-criminal
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code.pdf. The Republic of Latvia also refers to "cases provided for in international
agreements binding on the Republic of Latvia." Letter from the Ministry of the Republic
of Latvia to the Secretariat of the U.N., (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LVA crimin
al law.pdf. The Czech Republic also provides for jurisdiction over offenses in "cases
stipulated in a promulgated international treaty which is part of the legal order" in § 9,
and universal jurisdiction over international crimes in § 7, but nowhere mentions piracy
or UNCLOS. Law No. 40/2009 Coll., §§ 7, 9(1) (Czech), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CZE crimina
1_code_2010.pdf. The People's Republic of China also provides for jurisdiction over
offenses defined by treaties to which the PRC has acceded, but does not mention piracy.
See WEI Luo, THE AMENDED AND ANNOTATED CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 13 & art. 9 (2d ed. 2012). Poland
has several convention crimes of piracy, which are not subject to universal jurisdiction,
including agreeing to serve on a pirate ship. POLISH PENAL LAW art. 170 (Eng.),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
POLpenal-code.pdf. Similarly, the Omani Penal Code provides for "comprehensive
competence" for international crimes "depending on the type of the act committed and
the Omani state's eagerness to share in international crime fighting," but does not
mention piracy. SULTANATE OF OMAN PUBLIC PROSECUTION PENAL CODE art. 2.4 (Eng.),
available at https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/OmanCP.pdf See also U.N. Secretary-
General, Letter dated Mar. 23, 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, at 71, U.N. Doc. S/2012/177 (Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter SG March
2012 Summary] (explaining Oman's efforts to comply with international resolutions).
Iran refers only to the customary international law of piracy. See Iran's Piracy Law,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/IRNnationallegislation.pdf.
508 France recently amended its penal law to refer to the UNCLOS definition, but
did not include the actual wording of the definition. See LeSieur, supra note 311, at 118-
19 & n. 11 (2011) (quoting IMO, Piracy: Review of National Legislation, 7.2, LEG
96/7 (Aug. 20, 2009)), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-
content/uploads/20 10/10/IMO-Legal-Committee-Note-and-Report-on-Review-of-
National-Legislation-on-Piracy.pdf (noting how the generic approach was criticized by
the IMO, and may cause problems in prosecution because of the principle of legality);
News Wires, French Parliament Passes Sweeping Anti-Piracy Law, FRANCE24, Dec. 22,
2010, http://www.France24.com/en/20101222-france-parliament-passes-sweeping-anti-
piracy-law-pirates.
509 See Loi relative A la lutte contre la piraterie maritime [Piracy Act] of Dec. 30,
2009, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 14, 2010, art. 3, § 1,
(reflecting the UNCLOS definition of piracy almost verbatim, but specifically including
acts of preparation and attempt in paragraph (c) of the definition).
510 See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
511 See Law on Combating Piracy, Law No. 52/2012 (Piracy Law), 2012
(Somaliland).
512 States in this category are not always clear on their application of universal
jurisdiction or their relationship to UNCLOS. Estonia has a category of jurisdiction for
offenders who commit a crime and later become citizens of Estonia if there is dual
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criminality or no penal authority in the place of commission. This category would
include core international crimes, but it may also include other crimes like murder,
robbery, or any other penal offense. Additionally, crimes are punishable if they are
"punishable according to an international agreement binding on Estonia." Piracy appears
to be a non-international crime in the code. See Estonian Legislation on Piracy,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/EST legislati
on piracy.pdf. Greece refers to piracy jure gentium in its general part of the penal code,
but in the Greek Code on Public Maritime Law § 215, it applies a definition that seems
to use the UNCLOS definition of pirate ship as a ship intended for piracy, but only
including 101(a) type violent acts. Other types of complicity may be punishable under
other provisions. Additionally, Greece appears to require intention to rob. See Letter
from Hellenic Republic Ministry of Mercantile Marine, Aegean & Island Policy to IMO
Secretariat (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/GRC_piracy.pdf. Thailand's law bears an
unclear relationship to UNCLOS, only explicitly includes violent acts of piracy and
allows for jurisdiction over "[a]ny person who commits any offense under this Act
outside the kingdom [to] be punished in the kingdom"; however, this is not necessarily
universal jurisdiction. Act on Prevention & Suppression of Piracy, 1991, c. 10, § 28
(Thai.). Ukraine has a definition of piracy which diverges from UNCLOS, allowing
piracy to be committed on rivers, but suggests that universal jurisdiction might be proper
in cases in which it is allowed under UNCLOS, or if Ukrainian citizens are harmed. See
Criminal Code of Ukraine, 2001 (Ukraine). The Netherlands has a piracy law which was
adopted in 1881, significantly predating UNCLOS, which allows for universal
jurisdiction pursuant to section 4 of the criminal code. See Kenneth Manusama,
Prosecuting Pirates in the Netherlands: The Case of the MS Samanyolu, 49 MIL. L. & L.
OF WAR REv. 141, 146 (2010). Although the law significantly predates UNCLOS it was
considered to satisfy the requirements under UNCLOS. See A.H.A. SooNs & J.N.M.
SCHECHINGER, THE NETHERLANDS COUNTRY REPORT FOR THE CIL RESEARCH PROJECT ON
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES, 12-13 & n.34 (2011), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Country-Report-Netherlands.pdf
(discussing the universal jurisdiction in the Netherlands); id at 16-17 (discussing piracy
legislation, and noting it was found to fulfill obligations under UNCLOS). The
Netherlands has allowed for universal jurisdiction over pirates in several cases. See
Samanyolu Judgment, supra note 197, at 2 ("Firstly, it must be noted that the legislature
of the Netherlands has vested so-called universal jurisdiction for criminal proceedings in
cases of piracy."); SG March 2012 Summary, supra note 507, at 67-68 (listing and
summarizing cases).
513 Japan has recently enacted a law that punishes piracy but does not correspond
clearly to the UNCLOS definition of piracy. The definition of piracy has six
subsections, which can be interpreted as an itemization of the acts in UNCLOS Article
101: four types of acts of violence or depredation, referred to as "acts of piracy"; and two
types of preparation "for the purpose of committing acts of piracy." Attempt is punished
only for the first four "acts of piracy." Breaking into a ship, as well as operating a ship
in close proximity of a victim ship, both receive lesser punishment, and attempt of these
crimes is not punished. Finally, preparing weapons and operating a ship for the purpose
of piracy is a lesser offense, and punishment will further be reduced for a voluntary
surrender. See Ocean Policy Research Foundation [OPRF], Law on Punishment of and
Measures Against Acts of Piracy, art. 2, available at
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http://www.sof.orjp/en/topics/09_0 1.php.
514 See MICHAEL BOLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION § 6(3) (2008) (allowing jurisdiction over internationally protected
interests, including attacks on air and maritime traffic); id. § 316c (allowing jurisdiction
over attacks on air and maritime traffic). See INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE LAW
OF THE SEA, 2009 SUMMER CONFERENCE REPORT 6, http://www.iflos.org/
media/40696/conference%20report.pdf (describing a lecture by Dr. Ewald Brandt, Head
of Public Prosecutor's Office, Hamburg discussing Germany's exercise of jurisdiction
over Somali pirates); SG March 2012 Summary, supra note 507, at 32.
515 Suriname punishes the act of serving as captain or sailor on a pirate ship, like
the Netherlands, and allows for universal jurisdiction. See Shipping and Aviation
Crimes, 1971, tit. XXIX, art. 444 (Surin.), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/SURnational_%201egislationp
iracy.pdf. Italy has also emphasized that it will assert universal jurisdiction over piracy.
See Maritime Code, 2002, § 1, art. 1135, at 3 (It.) (implying in the statute that there is no
limit to its jurisdiction).
516 Countries in this category have various municipal definitions of piracy and do
not assert universal jurisdiction. Sri Lanka, for example, does not have the high seas or
the two-ship requirement and requires some nexus to prosecute. See Piracy Act, 2001,
pt. 11.3 (Sri Lanka), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LKAnational_%201egislationjiracy.pdf.
Russia also has an offense with no high seas requirement and does not mention universal
jurisdiction (there must also be intention to rob). See UGLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 227 (Russ.), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUSnationa
Ilegislationpiracy.pdf. Denmark's provision on taking control of a ship is similar; it is
much broader than the international offense of piracy, but Denmark does seem to take
universal jurisdiction where an international obligation is involved. See Letter from
Danish Maritime Authority to the Division for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, at 1
(Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DNK national legislation piracy.pdf; id.
at 5 (jurisdiction pursuant to treaty with obligation to prosecute). Turkey has universal
jurisdiction over a hijacking offense but apparently not over piracy as defined by
UNCLOS; it also states its position that prosecutions should be pursued by countries in
the region. See Turkey's Nat'l Legislation with Regard to Offences Related to Piracy &
Armed Robbery at Sea, 1-2, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TURpenal-criminalprocedure.pdf. The
Republic of Korea also addresses sea robbery but not piracy. See SUK-KYOON KIM &
SEoKwoo LEE, SOUTH KOREA'S COUNTRY REPORT FOR CIL RESEARCH PROJECT ON
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES 6-7 [hereinafter KIM & LEE, SOUTH KOREA'S
COUNTRY REPORT], available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/
Country-Report-South-Korea.pdf (noting that sea robbery under Korean law is limited to
nationals, and does not include voluntary participation or facilitation). See also Letter
from the Republic of Korea to the Division for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, at 1-
2, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/KOR
legislation_piracy.pdf.
517 Argentina has legislation on piracy that does not explicitly provide for universal
jurisdiction. See Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Arg. to the U.K. of Gr.
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Brit. & N. Ir. to the Secretary-General of the IMO (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ARG-nationa
1llegislation.pdf. Dutton includes this legislation in "no category." See Dutton,
Impunity Gap, supra note 251, at 1141.
518 The Republic of Philippines also defines piracy as a conventional crime and
does not appear to assert universal jurisdiction. See REVISED PENAL CODE, Act. No.
3815, arts. 122-23 (Phil.).
519 519 Countries in this category have other conventional offenses that cover piracy,
but some of them may have jurisdiction pursuant to treaty or other international law.
See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the U.N. to the Secretary-
General of the U.N., at 1 (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/AUT criminal code.pdf ("Most crimes
relating to maritime piracy can be subsumed to crimes enumerated in the Austrian
Criminal Code."). Norway states that its Penal Code potentially extends jurisdiction for
armed robbery to offenses committed by foreigners anywhere, but that practical
considerations would limit such prosecutions. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 12(4)(i),
arts. 266-69 (Nor.), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NORpenal code.pdf (explaining a claim
to universal jurisdiction in certain cases); Letter from Tonje Sund, Acting Deputy
Director General to the IMO, at 2 (Sept. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NORpiracy
summary.pdf (noting that jurisdiction will be only be taken "after thorough
consideration if the King (in council) so decides"). Jamaica appears to extend universal
jurisdiction to terrorism offenses but does not specifically address piracy. See Terrorism
Prevention Act 2003, art. 46 (Jam.), available at https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/
Jamaica Terrorism Prevention 2003.pdf ("For the purpose of conferring jurisdiction,
any offence committed outside of Jamaica shall be deemed to have been committed in
any place in Jamaica where the offender may for the time being be, if, had such offence
been committed in Jamaica, the offence would be a terrorism offence.").
520 See Al Qadhi, supra note 258 (explaining that Yemen does not have a piracy
law, but considers it to be a form of banditry and has also tried it as terrorism); Mashood
A. Basherin, Effective Legal Representation in "Shari 'ah" Courts as a Means of
Addressing Human Rights Concerns in the Islamic Criminal Justice System of Muslim
States, 11 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 135, 145-47 (2004) (discussing that for countries
applying Shari'ah criminal code, if maritime piracy is assimilated to brigandage or
highway robbery, it would become a hudud offense and be subject to prescribed fixed
and invariable punishment as provided by Islamic law, possibly raising human rights
concerns).
521 See also Rohit Kumar, The Piracy Bill 2012, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (May
1, 2012), http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-piracy-bill-2012-2298/ (discussing the
new legislation to be presented in India regarding piracy). See generally The Piracy Bill,
No. 34 of 2012, available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/
Piracy/piracy%20bill%20text%20 %202012.pdf for a look at how the UNCLOS
definition of piracy may make its way into Indian law.
522 These countries' piracy legislation were not classifiable.
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Table 2: Pirates Prosecuted or Awaiting Prosecution in
Twenty Countries




Number (Signatory UNC- Jurisdic-
Country Held Convicted of DCoC)s24  LOS?s2s tion? 26
Somalia - 290 Approx. (Nationals?) No No
"Puntland" 240






Somalia - 18 Status of (Nationals?) No No
South Central trial
unclear





Yemen 123 123; 6 Yes No Some 530
acquitted












Oman 32 25 Yes No No 532
Madagascar 12 Yes ? ?
2013] 565




Number (Signatory UNC- Jurisdic-
Country Held Convicted of DCoC)s 24  LOS?s25  tion?s2 ,
United 12 6 Yes Yes No5 33
Republic of
Tanzania
United Arab 10 Yes No No 534
Emirates
Comoros 6 Yes ? ?
India 119 No No No 535
Netherlands 29 19 No No Yes
United States 28 17 No Yes No
of America (Law of
Nations)
536
Italy 20 No No No





Germany 10 10 No No No537
Malaysia 7 No No No 3
Republic of 5 5 No No No539
Korea
Japan 4 No No No540
Spain 8 2 No No No 54 1
Belgium 2 1 No Yes No
Total 1071 1 1 1
523 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 2020 (2011), U.N. Doc. S/2012/783, 44 (Oct. 22, 2012). The right
three columns are my own additions. For some recent high-profile example of pirates
being released because they were not involved in a violent attack, see Cristina Silva, EU
Apprehends Then Releases Nine Suspected Pirates off Somalia, STARS AND STRIPES,
Nov. 23, 2012 (describing legal arguments); Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Why Do Naval
Patrols Keep Releasing Somali Pirates?, LLOYD'S LIST, Mar. 22, 2011 (describing letter
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from Combined Task Force to Intertanko which states that pirates do not have to be
caught in the act of an attack to be prosecuted, as a response to "incendiary piracy
capture-and-release story"); Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Pirate Operations Disrupted as
Second Mothership Captured, LLOYD'S LIST, Feb. 16, 2011, at 2 (noting pirates released
because "they were not committing an act of piracy").
524 This column is used to assess the level of prosecutions in regional states as
opposed to non-regional states. An arbitrary definition of "regional" is used, based on the
signatories of the original Djibouti Code of Conduct. See IMO, Protection of Vital
Shipping Lanes, Annex, at 4, IMO Doc. C 102/14 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/Signatory-States.aspx. "Nationals" is
used to emphasize that prosecutions in Somalia itself could potentially be handled under
traditional criminal frameworks, since the perpetrators are nationals.
525 This field denotes whether the prosecution was under a direct application of
UNCLOS, or a national implementation that closely mirrors its provisions, using the
same language.
526 This column is based on explicit assertions of universal jurisdiction by the court,
or an assessment of the nationality of the victims and perpetrators.
527 Somaliland originally provided figures, which were reported in the UNODC's
brochure of September/October 2011 of 94 pirates held, and 68 convicted. Apparently
60 were later released. See SG Report Jan. 2012, supra note 29, 1 10; E-mail from
Wayne Miller, Media Consultant, Counter Piracy Programme, UNODC, to author (Mar.
14, 2012, 6:01 AM) (on file with author). More recent figures show 24 pirates held and
24 convicted. UNODC Brochure July 2012, supra note 523, at 16. Inaccuracy of
reporting, potential corruption, and subsequent releases has also occurred in Puntland.
See U.N.S.C. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 2002 (2011) 202-03, U.N. Doc. S/2012/544 (Jul. 13, 2012).
528 Somaliland has introduced a new bill as of March 2012 which will apply an
UNCLOS-based definition, and universal jurisdiction. See supra note 511.
529 Kenya accepted the first universal-jurisdiction transfer of 10 Somali pirates who
hijacked the Indian-registered dhow the Safina-al-Bisarat on Jan. 29, 2006. In
November 2006, each of the pirates was sentenced to seven years. See Somali "Pirates"
Charged in Kenya, BBC NEWS AFRICA, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4677148.stm; Jail Sentence for Somali Pirates, BBC
NEWS AFRICA, Nov. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6105262.stm; see also
Paul Raffaelle, The Pirate Hunters, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, Aug. 2007, available at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/piratemain.html?c=y&page=5
(presenting a dramatic depiction of the case).
530 Yemen accepted some transfers of pirates from international forces in 2008 and
2009. The high costs associated with detention eventually led Yemen to terminate the
arrangement. It now prosecutes pirates who have been captured in Yemeni waters, or
attack Yemeni ships. See Somali Piracy Threatening Yemen, YEMEN TIMES, Feb. 6,
2012, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1529/report/320/Somali-piracy-threatening-
Yemen.htm.
531 On November 5, 2012, 15 more pirates were convicted for hijacking an Indian
oil tanker, bringing the total number of convictions to 98. See Press Release, United
States Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200232.htm.
532 The Omani trials involved pirates who attempted attacks while at port in Oman,
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in Omani territorial waters, or against Omani citizens, and were apparently based on
conventional crimes. See Ten Somali Pirates Sentenced to Life Imprisonment,
GULFNEWS.COM, Nov. 2, 2011, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/ten-somali-pirates-
sentenced-to-life-imprisonment-1.922673 (describing one attack in port, and another on
an Omani vessel holding livestock near port); Oman Court Sentences Somalian Pirates
to Life Imprisonment, GULFNEWS.COM, Dec. 4, 2010,
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-court-sentences-somalian-pirates-to-life-
imprisonment-1.722934 (describing the first prosecution of pirates for an attack on an
Omani fishing boat outside of Omani territory).
533 The Tanzanian case apparently was prosecuted on the basis of the new law, but
did not involve universal jurisdiction since the pirates were captured in Tanzanian
waters. See Roger L. Phillips, Tanzania - A Case Study, COMMUNIS HosTis OMNIUM,
Mar. 3, 2011, http://piracy-law.com/2011/03/03/tanzania-a-case-study/; supra note
262.
534 The case before the federal court in the United Arab Emirates involves an attack
on an Emirati ship. See Haneen Dajani, Pirates "Were Forced to Raid UAE Vessel,"
THE NATIONAL, May 2, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/courts/pirates-
were-forced-to-raid-uae-vessel.
535 See supra note 521 (stating that the new law will provide for an UNCLOS-
based definition of piracy and universal jurisdiction).
536 Compare United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated
680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the definition of piracy in United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. 154 (1820)), with United States v. Hasan, 747 F.Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(applying the definition of UNCLOS), aff'd, United States v. Dire, No. 11-4310, at *41 -
42 (4th Cir. May 23, 2012). See also supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
537 Although German law may allow for universal jurisdiction, Germany generally
prefers not to exercise it. See sources cited supra note 541; M. Gebauer, H. Knaup &
Marcel Rosenbach, First Trial of Somali Pirates Poses Headache for Germany, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 20, 2010,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0, 1518,689745,00.html.
538 The Malaysian trial involved a charge under the Firearms (Increased Penalties)
Act of 1971 for firing on Malaysian commandos who were attempting to rescue a
hijacked crew in the Gulf of Aden. See Andrea Botorff, Malaysian Court Charges
Suspected Somali Pirates, JURIST, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/02/malaysia-court-
charges-suspected-somali-pirates.php.
539 South Korea has a law of piracy that differs from UNCLOS and is limited to
nationals. See KIM & LEE SOUTH KOREA'S COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 516, at 6-7.
540 Japan's piracy trial is based on its newly amended piracy law, but involves an
attack on a Japanese oil tanker. See Captured Pirates to Face Trial in Japan, DEFENCE
WEB, Mar. 10, 2011,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id= 14040:
captured-pirates-to-face-trial-in-japan&catid=5 1:Sea&Itemid= 106.
541 Spain's doctrine of absolute universal jurisdiction has been a very contentious
subject. As a result, a new bill was passed on November 5, 2009 limiting the jurisdiction
of Spanish courts for all international crimes (including piracy) to cases in which the
perpetrator is present on Spanish soil, the victims are Spanish, or there is some
demonstrated relevant link to Spain, and no other state or international tribunal asserts
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jurisdiction. See Ley Orgdnica 1/2009, de 3 de noviembre, complementaria de la Ley de
reforma de la legislaci6n procesal para la implantaci6n de la nueva Oficina judicial, por
la que se modifica la Ley Orgdnica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial, BOE-A-
2009-17492 (Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-
17492. For English translation and relevant background, see Ignacio de la Rasilla del
Moral, The Swan Song of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 777,
803-04 (2010). The Spanish piracy involved a successful kidnapping of a crew that
included 36 Spanish nationals. See Spain Sentences Somali Pirates to 439 Years' Jail
Each, BBC NEWS EUROPE, May 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
13272669.

